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RULE 146: THE PRIVATE OFFERING EXEMPTION-
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND ANALYSIS
STANLEY SCHWARTZ, JR,*
I. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
As a reaction to the speculative abuses of the '20s, Congress enacted
the Securities Act of 19331 to regulate the distribution of securities in
interstate commerce. The scheme of the Act was to provide for the reg-
istration of all securities prior to distribution with certain exceptions
carved out. One of these exceptions was for "transactions by an issuer
not involving a public offering. ' 2  The Act does not contain a definition
of the term "public offering." A reference to legislative reports provides
little guidance for the exegesis of the exemption. The House Report on
Member of the Ohio Bar. The assistance of Edwin M. Walker III, an associate of the
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115 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970) (hereinafter cited as the Act).
2 Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1970). This provision appeared s §
4'(1) of the Act but was renumbered § 4(2) by the Securities Act Amendments of 1964.
Pub. L. No. 88-467, §12, 78 Star. 565, 580, amending 15 U.S.C. §77d(1) (1958). The bill
originally introduced in the House of Representatives (H.R. 4314 by Mr. Rayburn, March 29,
1933) in §12(c) exempted:
Isolated transactions in which any security is sold, offered for sale, subscription,
or delivery by the owner thereof, or by his representative solely for the owner's ac-
count, such sale or offer for sale, subscription, or delivery not being made in the
course of repeated and successive transactions of a like character by such owner for the
purpose of engaging in the purchase and sale of securities as a business, and such
owner or representative not being the underwriter of such security,
Mr. Rayburn introduced H.R. 5480 on May 3, 1933, which contained substantially ell of
the provisions of the Act as enacted. As introduced, the cognate provision of §4(1) exempted
"transactions by an issuer not with or through an underwriter." In the House debates, Mr,
Rayburn added a Committee Amendment: the words ". . . and not involving any public of.
fering," were added after the word "underwriter." This was termed a "clarifying amendment."
7 Cong. Rec. 2910 at 2954 (1933). The bill was passed with Section 4(1) in this form.
The Senate had before it S.R. 875, introduced by Mr. Robinson on March 29, 1933, which
was substantially the same as H.R. 4314, anti retained the same form when passed by the
Senate as an amendment to H.R. 5480 on May 8, 1933. Section 12(c) of S.R. 875 as passed
by the Senate exempted only isolated transactions in "... securit[ies] issued subsequent to
the date of approval...." of the Act.
A conference committee was appointed May 9, 1933, which recommended the Act as
enacted, subssantially in the form of H.R. 5480, and without change to Section 4(1) as set
forth above. The committee did not comment on the resolution of the differences between
Section 4(1) and Section 12(c) of S.R. 875. The House on May 22, 1933, and the Senate on
May 23, 1933, agreed to the report and it was approved on May 27, 1933.
The phrase ". . . not with or through an underwriter" was deleted in §203(a) of the Se-
curities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§78a et seq. (1970) (hereinafter referred to as
the Exchange Act). This was regarded as "really superfluous." H.R. Rep 18i3X, '7"rd C'ong,
2d. Sess. 41. The complete legislative history of the Act and the Exchange Act can be found
in J. S. ELLENBERGER AND E. P. MAHAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES Acr OF
1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973).
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the Act indicates that the registration requirement of § 53 is intended to
provide "full and fair disclosure" with respect to new offerings of secu-
rities.4 This should be read in conjunction with another phrase from the
House Report which states that the Act
carefully exempts from its application certain types of securities and se-
curities transactions where there is not practical need for its application
or where the public benefits are too remote.5
With particular reference to § 4(1), the Report indicates that the exemp-
tion is available "to permit an issuer to make a specific or isolated sale
of its securities to a particular person" but is not available for sales
'made generally to the public."'
The importance of exemption from registration can be best under-
stood when one considers the expense, difficulty, and time consumed by
registration under the provisions of the Act. A registration of securities
under the Act ordinarily will require the services of lawyers, accountants,
and printers, and possibly other expert services. Depending upon the
number of times that a particular issuer has registered securities, the size
of the issue, and the novelty or complexity of problems that may be in-
volved in the registration process, costs may range from $35,000 to
$100,000 or perhaps higher-even without considering underwriters dis-
3 Sec. 5. (a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlaw-
ful for any person, directly or indirectly
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communicaion
in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use ormedium
of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce,
by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of
sale or for delivery after sale.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments or transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any prospectus relating to
any security with respect to which a registration statement has been filed under this
tide, unless such prospectus meets the requirements of section 10; or
(2) to carry or to cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce
any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, unless accom-
panied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements of subsection (a) of
section 10.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any pro.
spectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to
such security, or while the registration statement is the subject of a refusal order or
stop order or (prior to the effective date of the registration statement) any public
proceeding or examination under section 8.
For a discussion of the registration requirements, see C. IsRAELS AND G. DUFF, WHEN COX-
PORATIONS GO PUBuC (1962).
4 H.R. REP. 73rd Cong. 1st Sess. 1 (1933) (hereinafter cited as House Report).
5 House Report, supra4 note 4, at 5.
6 House Report, supra note 4, at 16.
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counts and commissions, which may be as high as fifteen percent.' Unless
the issue is fortunate enough to receive cursory review (an expedited pro.
cedure normally reserved for issues after the first one), 8 two to three
months' time for review by the staff of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) is not unusual. In comparison, a private placement re-
quires no filing with or review by the SEC and much smaller under-
writing commissionsY
Prior to 1953, the legal constraints of the private placement exemp-
tion received little attention. An early SEC Release 0 stated that the
factors to be considered in determining the applicability of § 4(2) of the
Act were:
1. The number of offerees and their relationship to each other
and to the issuer;
2. The number of units offered;
3. The size of the offering; and
4. The manner of the offering,
In applying this section prior to 1953, courts typically examined all
of the facts surrounding a sale, and on the basis of this factual inquiry,
determined whether a transaction constituted a "public offering" requir-
ing registration or qualified for the § 4(2) exemption. 1
As a practical matter, both the staff of the SEC and the practicing
bar tended to focus on the question of the number of offerees. In the
same Release, the General Counsel's Office expressed the view that an
offering to "an insubstantial number of persons" would not constitute
a public offering. A rule of thumb was suggested to the effect that "un-
der ordinary circumstances an offering to not more than approximately
twenty-five persons is not an offering to a substantial number and prob-
7In the recent offering by Kenai Drilling Limited of units consisting of one common share
andtwo warrants, at $4.50 per unit, the issuer paid underwriters discounts of $234,406 and
paid all of its filing, printing, legal, accounting and miscellaneous expenses amounting to ap-
proximately $140,000. The issuer thus received approximately $1,538,094 out of total pro.
ceeds of $1,912,500, or approximately 79.7%. In addition, the underwriter received a 30-
day option to purchase additional units to cover over-allotments which could have provided
the underwriter with an additional $17,691; the underwriter received preferential financing
rights, a three-year warrant for 42,500 shares of common stock similar to the warrant sold as
part of the unit, a three year "financial consulting arrangement" at $6,000 per year and in-
demnification rights.
833 FED. REG. 17900; Securities Act Release No. 33-4934.
9 State "Blue Sky" laws may require registration. See, e.g., 01110 REV. CODE ANN, §
1707.06 (Page 1964).
I0 11 FED. REG. 10952 (1935) (hereinafter cited as Release 285).
11 See, e.g., SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938) (offer to 530
stockholders held a public offering).
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ably does not involve a public offering.':- In this connection, one au-
thority has noted:
As a practical matter this is the test which many lawyers have used to
mark the zone of danger. Offers to twenty-five persons are regarded as -
safe; if more than that are involved, there must be other factors justify-
ing the larger number.'3
In Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co.," the
United States Supreme Court changed this approach. Ralston Purina
was a large public corporation. At the time of the case, it had approxi-
mately 7,000 employees. Beginning in 1911, the company encouraged
stock ownership among its employees. Between 1947 and 1951, Ralston
Purina sold nearly $2,000,000 of its common stock to its employees in
reliance upon the private offering exemption. According to the opinion:
Among those responding to these offers [for sale of Ralston Purina
stock] were employees with duties of the artist, bake-shop foreman, chow
loading foreman, clerical assistant, copywriter, electrician, stock clerk,
mill office clerk, order credit trainee, production trainee, stenographer
and veterinarian.5
The buyers were dispersed throughout the country. The lowest salary
bracket of those purchasing during the four years in question was
$2,435.00. During the period in question, between 400 and 1,100 per-
sons purchased stock under the program. It was estimated that offers
were made to 500 employees in 1951, when the program was discon-
tinued because of litigation.
While conceding that an offering to all its employees would be a
public offering not within the scope of the exemption, the company con-
tended that all employees who purchased were "key employees." The
Court found that the sale of stock by Ralston Purina was not entitled to
the private placement exemption. This holding surprised no one as it
certainly was in the mainstream of the interpretation of the statute at that
time. Unfortunately, as so often happens in law, it was not the holding
of the Court but the dicta that sowed the seed of future uncertainty.
Thus, the Court said:
The exemption as we construe it, does not deprive corporate em.
ployees, as a class, of the safeguards of the Act. We agree that some em-
ployee offerings may come within § 4(1), e.g., one made to executive
12 Release 285, supra note 10.
13 R. JENNINGS AND H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS (3d
ed. 1973) at 408 (hereinafter cited as JENNINGS AND MARSH).
14 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
Is 346 U.S. at 121.
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personnel who because of their position have access to the same kind of
information that the Act would make available in the form of a registra.
tion statement. Absent such a showing of special circumstances, employ-
ees are just as much members of the investing 'public' as any of their
neighbors in the community.18
Each of these sentences taken separately is unexceptional. Strung to-
gether, they have led some commentators to believe that a private offer-
ing could only be made to a group of persons who had some special "ac-
cess" to the issuer, such as directors and executive personnel.
The SEC asked the Court to hold that "an offering to a substantial
number of the public" is not exempt, but the Court went on to say
We are advised that 'whatever the special circumstances, the Com-
mission had consistently interpreted the exemption as being inapplicable
when a large number of offerees is involved.' But the statute would seem
to apply to a 'public offering' whether to few or many.17
When this additional ingredient was mixed in the stew, it became an un-
palatable diet for issuers. No longer-was there any safety in numbers.
Now, an offering to a single person could theoretically be "public," al-
though in some cases, offerings to nearly 100 institutional investors were
held to be private. 8
There was other dicta in Ralston Purina that contributed to the en-
suing confusion with respect to the private offering exemption. The
Court said:
The natural way to interpret the private offering exemption is in light
of the statutory purpose. Since exempt transactions are those as to which
'there is no practical need for [the bill's] application,' the applicability of
§4(1) [now § 4(2)] should turn on whether the particular class of
persons affected needs the protection of the Act. An offering to those
who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not in-
volving any public offering." 9
It became the SEC staff position to inquire whether there was evidence
that the offerees could "fend for themselves. '120  Read literally, that inter-
pretation can be made; but if we look at the facts of the case and the
number of persons involved, we realize that the Court was focusing upon
the peculiar circumstances set forth in the opinion. Note that in the
original House Report on the Securities Act of 1933 two reasons were
given for the private placement exemption. First, "where there was no
16 346 U.S. at 125-6 (Footnotes excluded).
17 346 U.S. at 125 (Emphasis added).
18JENNINGS AND MARSH, supra note 13, at 409.
19 346 U.S. at 124.
2 0 See, e.g., Rule 146 Release, infra note 46.
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practical need for [the bill's3 application," and secondly, "where the
public benefits are too remote." The Court did not refer to the second
reason in its opinion because it was not involved in the facts of the par-
ticular case. If the number of stockholders had been reduced by ninety
percent, the latter rationale might well have been a basis for affirming the
exemption.
After Ralston Purina, the word "access" became a term of art. The
highwater mark of this school of thought was the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Continental Tobacco, Inc., 1
which threw the securities bar into chaos with respect to opinions on the
availability of the private placement exemption. The position of the
SEC in its brief on appeal was the exacerbating factor.2
Continental Tobacco developed a new product, Venture cigarettes,
which were supposedly low in carcinogens. In 1967, the company made
various offerings of securities without registration under the Act which
resulted in the entry in the district court of an injunction against further
violations. In 1968, the company was reorganized under the provisions
of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act.23 Beginning in the spring of 1969
and ending in the fall of 1970, new management attempted to refinance
the company through the sale of 200,000 shares of common stock at
$1.00 a share. Very careful preparations were attempted in order to com-
ply with § 4(2) of the Act. As the court noted:
Prior to the planned offering and attempted sale of its common stock
to prospective purchasers, Continental apparently sought to lay the foun-
dation for an exemption of such common stock from the registration
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933. First, it had prepared a bro-
chure on its prospects, including unaudited financial statements for the
period ending May 15, 1969. As Continental's circumstances changed,
the brochure was updated in the months of February and June of 1970,
and the unaudited financial statements were updated to the period ending
December 31, 1969. The front cover of the brochure carried the follow-
ing legend:
The shares offered in this Private Replacement [sic) had not been
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and are offered under a specific
exemption which depends upon the Investment Intent of the Purchas-
ers of these shares.
Secondly, Continental had a standard Subscription Agreement and
Investment Letter prepared. It was contemplated that the Subscriplion
21463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
22 See notes 40-41, infra and accompanying text.
23 11 U.S.C. §§701 et seq. (1970).
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Agreement and Investment Letter would be executed by all investors in
the common stock of Continental.2 4
Lastly, Continental stamped on eacfi certificate of its common stock a
red legend reading as follows:
These securities may not be sold, transferred, pledged, or hypothe-
cated unless they have first been registered under the Securities Act of
1933 or unless counsel satisfactory to the Company has given an opin-
ion that registration under said Act or applicable blue sky laws is not
required.
24 The following is the text of the Subscription Agreement and Investment Letter:
Continental Tobacco Company
of South Carolina, Inc.
Columbia, South Carolina
Gentlemen:
I hereby subscribe to - shares of your company's unregistered common
stock at a price of $1.00 per share for an aggregate of $--.
In connection with the purchase by me of shares of your common stock, I hereby
represent to you that such are being acquired for investment and not with a view to,
or for resale in connection with, any distribution of such shares,
By such representation I mean that I intend to hold such shares for investment
for my own account, and that I do not intend to dispose of all or any part of such
shares unless, and until, I determine that some change in my personal circumstances,
by reason of some intervening event not now in contemplation, has occurred which
makes such disposition necessary.
I understand that the shares being issued to me have not been registered under
the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, by reason of a specific exemption under the
provision of the Act which depends upon my investment intent. In this connection,
I undersand that in the view of the Securities and Exchange Commission the statu-
tory basis for such exemption would not be present if my representation merely meant
that my present intention was to hold such stock for the six months' capital gains
period of the tax satutes, for a deferred sale, for a market rise, for a sale if the market
does not rise, or for a year or other fixed period in the future. I realize that in the
view of the Commission a purchase now with an intent to resell by reason of any fore-
seeable specific contingency or an anticipated change in market values, or in your
condition or that of the industry, or in connection with a contemplated liquidation
or settlement of any loan obtained by me for the acquisition of such shares and for
which such shares were pledged for security, would represent a purchase with an
intent inconsistent with my representation to you, and the Commission might regard
such a sale or disposition as a de!erred sale as to which the exemption is not available.
I understand the nature of the inves:ment being made and the financial risks
thereof. I have received a copy of your written prospectus including unaudited finan.
cial statements as of May 15, 1969 by Clarkson, Harden & Gantt, Certified Public
Accountants. I have read and reviewed same and I have questioned the officers of
the company and counsel for the company concerning the business and financial state.
ments of the company and have been offered access to any and all records of the com-
pany and I do not desire any further information or data concerning your company.
I consent that you may, if you so desire, permit the transfer of the shares referred
to herein out of my name only when my request for transfer is accompanied by
either an opinion of counsel to the effect that neither the sale nor the proposed (sic]
results is a violation of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or a no-action letter
from the Commission with respect to the proposed transfer. I agree that a legend to
this effect may be placed on the certificate or certificates delivered to me or any sub.
stitute therefor.
Very truly yours,
463 F.2d at 146, n.l.
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Meetings were held by the Tews (management] with prospective
purchasers, through the help of friends and contacts in the legal profes-
sion and the broker-dealer business, and through the support of investors.
The record is replete with testimony describing, illustrating, and explain-
ing each of these aids to the 1969-1970 offering of the common stock
of Continental. 25
The trial cout 6 found facts supporting the exemption. As was noted
by the appellate court:
Apparently, the-District Court arrived at this conclusion by finding
that "from approximately June, 1969, until October, 1970, the defendant,
Continental, offered common stock to thirty-eight persons, of which it
sold common stock to thirty-five persons"; that "almost all of these inves-
tors executed an agreement with the defendant corporation prior to the
purchase of their common stock ("investment letters") which acknowl-
edge receipt of a brochure concerning the corporation and which included
unaudited financial statements"; that "the testimony of the common stock
purchasers of Continental, who were called as witnesses by the plaintiff,
established that these investors had received both written and oral in-
formation concerning the corporation, that they had access to any addi-
tional information which they might have required or requested, that they
had personal contacts with the officers of the defendant corporation"; that
"these witnesses further testified that they knew the risk of their invest-
ments, that they knew the stock was not registered, and that they had
purchased the stock with the intent to hold the stock for investment and
not to resell it"; that "the evidence also showed that the stock has re-
mained in the hands of the original purchasers and that the defendant,
Continental, had refused to allow transfer of this unregistered stock",;
and that "the experience and background of these investors were such
that they were in a position to make an informed investment decision,
i.e., they could fend for themselves.
Furthermore, the Court found that the persons who were offered
common stock, options to purchase common stock, and promissory notes
by the defendant corporation were furnished and/or provided access to
the same type and kind of information that would have otherwise been
provided in a registration statement filed pursuant to the Securities Act
of 1933, as amended, and rules and regulations thereunder.2't
The SEC in its brief on appeal disputed most vigorously the district
court's findings of access.
The required relationship must be such that the offeree has access
to corporate information-not because he has been the gratuitous recipi-
25 463 F.2d at 146.
26 326 F. Supp. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
"7 463 F.2d at 157. It is difficult to reconcile the district court's finding of thirty-eight put-
chasers, apparently accepted by the appellate court, with the interrogatory iited in the opinion
(463 F.2d at 154) showing twenty-eight purchasers, including Tew, the president of the com-
pany and two others who received stock pursuant to the Chapter II proceedings.
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ent of a promotional circular about an unfamiliar company, but because
his position or connection with the company enables him to demand and
receive first hand on all relevant facts .. in other words, . . . each of-
feree [has] a relationship to the company tantamount to that of an 'in-
sider' in terms of his ability to know, to understand and to verify for
himself all of the relevant facts about the company and its securities. 28
The court of appeals reversed the district court's judgment and re-
manded for appropriate injunctive relief. In an opinion that may serve
as a model for arcane obscurity in the securities field, the court found
two basic reasons for denying the exemption. The first was:
The record does not establish that each offeree had a relationship with
Continental giving access to the kind of information that registration
would have disclosed.2*
Note at this point, how the word "access" has developed. In Ralston
Purina, the Supreme Court indicated that perhaps an offering to a large
number of employees would still be a private offering if they were execu-
tive personnel who, because of their position, would have "access to the
same kind of information that the Act would make available in the form
of a registration statement."30  In Continental Tobacco, the court of ap-
peals makes "access" the touchstone regardless of the numbers involved.
The appellate court went on in discussing this point to say that "some of
the purchasers had never met any officers of the company prior to ac-
quiring the stock.' '3 The court evidently overlooked the fact that pri-
vate placements develop principally as a method of distribution to insti-
tutional investors through investment bankers, and that these institutional
investors customarily did not meet with officers of the company.82
The second reason for the holding against the exemption was that the
evidence of the number of actual offerees (not purchasers) was insuffi-
cient. The court reached this conclusion despite the finding of the district
court that there were only thirty-eight offerees. "3 The court then noted that
Continental failed to sustain its burden of proving there existed no prac-
tical need for the application of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933
to its 1969-1970 offering of securities. Neither did it prove that the
public benefits to be derived from registration were too remote.84
28 Brief for Appellant 26, 28.
29463 F.2d at 158.
30 346 U.S. at 125-6.
81463 F.2d at 158.
32$ee C. WHrrMAN, Private Placements and Rule 146 in THI SEC SPBAKs AGAIN 132
(1973) (hereinafter cited as WHITMAN).
33 See note 27, supra.
84 463 F.2d at 160.
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Two comments are in order about the opinion. First, there is prob-
ably a technical but harsh ground for finding against Continental. This
is based upon the court's statement that "the evidence shows that neither
Theodore King nor T. M. Alexander ever had access to one of Conti-
nental's prospectuses ..... ,1 The other comment is that the opinion was
based upon the application of a heavy burden of proof to the party claim-
ing the exemption. There is substantial judicial support for this burden. 0
It has been said that proof must be "explicit, exact and not built on con-
clusory statements. ' 37  But, it might be well to stop a minute and specu-
late as to what public purpose is served by imposing such a heavy
burden upon one claiming an exemption from the registration process.
As was previously noted,"' registration is expensive, time consuming, and
for many young companies, impossible within their resources. Public pol-
icy is both served by protecting investors through the registration process
and encouraging growth of young developing companies. Continental
Tobacco might present an interesting application of this theory. This
company was engaged in the production of a cigarette that was purport-
edly low in carcinogens and thus less likely to produce cancer. Coming
out of a bankruptcy reorganization, it may have found registration im-
possible. At no time did the SEC claim that Continental's disclosure
document was other than a complete and fair presentation of the facts
relating to the company. Isn't public policy better served by a balanc-
ing of the needs of growing companies for venture capital against the
needs of investors for protection? With this kind of a standard, the
court of appeals would have had substantial difficulties in overturning
the very clear findings of the district court based on the facts described
above3
35 Id.
36 SECv. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Hill York Corp., 448 F.2d 680 (5th
Cir. 1971); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971); Chapman v. Dunn, 414
F.2d 1531 (Cth Cir. 1969); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 367 F.2d 675 (4th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959); SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 1938).
In Ralston Purina, the Court cited as its authority for this proposition the case of Schlemmer
v. Buffalo, Rochester and Pittsburgh Ry., 205 U.S. 1 (1907). In that case, plaintiff's decedent
was killed while trying to couple a s:eam shovel to a train. The steam shovel did not have an
automatic coupling device required by the Safety Appliance Act of 1893. On appe-al, defendant
attempted to argue that plaintiff had not shown the proviso to be inapplicable. Mr. Justice
Holmes for the Court stated that the proviso carves certain cases out of the statute and that the
burden of proof followed the rule of construction, !o that defendant would have to show that
it fell within the proviso. The rule of construction that excep:ios to remedial statutes are
strictly construed is ancient. See, e.g., J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1st ed.
1883).
47 Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
-
38 See notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
39 See text accompanying notes 24-28.
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Much of the result of Continental Tobacco was induced by the brief
of the SEC. Former SEC Commissioner Owens characterized the SEC's
brief as overly restrictive,40 and it has been suggested on various occasions
that the decision of the court of appeals resulted from the position of the
SEC's staff.41  If the SEC's position were to be taken literally, private
placements could only be made to highest executive officers and directors
of a corporation.
II. Ru.E 146
A. Preliminary Matters Concerning The Rule
The SEC initially proposed Rule 146 in November 1972,2 and after
receiving many comments,43 released for comment a second draft.4 Af-
ter again receiving numerous comments, the SEC adopted a third ver-
sion on April 23, 1974. 41 The text of the Rule is set forth in full in the
appendix to this article.
What has been designated as Rule 146 under the Securities Act of
1933 is entitled "Transactions by an Issuer Deemed Not to Involve Any
Public Offering." The Rule was adopted pursuant: both to §§ 4(2) and
19(a) of the Act.4 Section 19(a) gives the SEC the power to make
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of this title,... and defining accounting, technical and trade terms used
in this title.47
Thus, Rule 146 is a definition of transactions by an issuer not involving
any public offering.
The Rule was accompanied by a release which includes a general dis-
cussion of the history of the private placement exemption prior to the
adoption of the Rule and continues the exegesis of the word "access":
[It] is frequently asserted that wealthy persons and certain other persons
such as lawyers, accountants and businessmen are "sophisticated" investors
who do not need the protections afforded by the Act. It is the Commis-
sion's view that "sophistication" is not a substitute for access to the same
type of information that registration would provide .... On the other
4 0 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 127, G-1 (May 17, 1972).
41 Frome, Private Placements-Rule 146, N.Y.Lj., Sept. 10, 1973 at I.
42 Securities Act Release No. 5336 (Nov. 28, 1972).
4 3 WHITMAN, supra note 32.
44 Securities Act Release No. 5440 (October 10, 1973).
45 17 C.F.R. §230.146 (1974).
40 39 FED. REG. 15261 at 15268 (hereinafter cited as 146 Release).
47 As Rule 146 was promulgated under §19(a) of the 1933 Act, issuers acting in good
faith in reliance upon it are shielded from liability under the 1933 Act, even if Rule 146 is
later determined to-be invalid for any reason.
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hand, the Commission is of the view that an offeree need not be an in-
sider such as an officer or a director of the issuer in order to have access
to such informationA8
This would appear to be a retreat from the extreme position of Conti-
nental Tobacco.
B. Rule 146-Preliminary Notes
The Rule is preceded by seven preliminaary notes, the first of which
deals with the question of exclusivity. In simple words, exclusivity means
that the private placement exemption would only be available to those
who comply with Rule 146, and that the general body of law relating
to § 4(2) of the Act would not be available. The question of exclusiv-
ity is of great concern to the securities bar. The fear has been expressed
that courts and lawyers will be unwilling to take the risk of going be-
yond Rule 146's boundaries." The Committee on Securities Regulation
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York commented:
[W]e believe it most important that the Rule as adopted, or accompany-
ing notes, make it very clear that the Rule is non-exclusive, that it is rec-
ognized that there are many circumstances not encompassed by the Rule
such as those previously mentioned under which transactions would be
properly exempted by Section 4(2) and that the requirements of the Rule
should not be regarded as defining the scope or ingredients of the Section
4(2) exemption for private placement transactions generally or be incor-
porated into administrative interpretations applicable to other private
placement transactions under Section 4(2). Noting the substantial con-
ditions to the availability of the exemptions set forth in the proposed
Rule, the Committee believes that unless there is such an aggressive state-
ment of non-exclusivity it would be preferable not to adopt the proposed
Rule.50
The Commission responded favorably to the concerns of the bar in this
matter and the first preliminary note includes a statement that:
Transactions by an issuer which do not satisfy all of the conditions
of this Rule shall not raise any presumption that the exemption provided
by Section 4(2) of the Act is not available for such transactions. Issuers
wanting to rely on that exemption may do so by complying with adminis-
48 146 Release at 15261 (emphasis added).
49' Wander and Shevitz, Rule 146 Adopted, THE REviEw OF SEcurrnIm REGULATION,
June 5, 1974, at 27 (hereinafter cited as Wander and Shevitz). "However, as a practical mat-
ter, it [Rule 146) is likely to beccme exclusive. Cour:s may tend to apply the more objective
standards of the rule where they previously struggled with the ambiguities of the 4(2) exemp-
tion, thus rendering compliance with Rule 146 equivalent to compliance with Section 4(2)."
50 Letter from the Committee on Securities Regulation of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York to the Chief Counsel, Division of Corporate Finance, Securities and Exchange
Commission, January 25, 1973.
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trative and judicial interpretations in effect at the time of the transactions.
Attempted compliance with this rule does not act as an election; the is-
suer can also claim the availability of Section 4(2) outside the rule.
Preliminary note 3, pointing to the strictures of paragraph (b) of the
Rule states:
In order to obtain the protection of the Rule, all its conditions must
be satisfied and the issuer claiming the availability of the Rule has the
burden of establishing in an appropriate forum that it has satisfied them.
The burden of proof applies with respect to each ofleree as well as each
purchaser.
Preliminary note 6 provides that the Rule is available only to the is-
suer of securities and is not available to affiliates or other persons for
sales of the issuer's securities (sometimes known as a "replacement").
Private placements or replacements by non-issuers must find an exemp-
tion under § 4(1) of the Act5 ' if at all. This exemption is sometimes
referred to as the § 4(1- )" exemption, falling somewhere between
§ 4(1) and § 4(2).;- Many commentators have felt that there is a seri-
ous omission in Rule 146 in not dealing with the § 4(1-1/2) problem,5
51 § 4. The provisions of section 5 shall not apply to (1) transactions by any person other
than an issuer, underwriter or dealer...
15 U.S.C. §77d(1) (1970).
52 Wander and Shevitz, supra note 49.
53 See, e.g., Letter of ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Subcommittee
on Private Offerings to the Securities and Exchange Commission dated January 24, 1973
(hereinafter referred to as Subcommittee Letter):
Technically, §4(2) of the 1933 Act recognizes a non-public offering exemption
for issuers only. Nevertheless, as a matter of administrative practice, the SEC has
recognized that holders of restricted securities may resell in transactions not involving
a public offering. In fact Rule 144(e)(3)(G) specifically recognizes that securities sold
pursuant to an exempion provided by §4(2) are not to be counted in determining
the amount of securities that may be sold pursuant to the Rule. The staff of the Di-
vision of Corporation Finance has indicated that this reference was intended to mean
that a selling shareholder could make a private placement of his security holdings con-
sistent with prevailing interpretations of §4(2).
Now the SEC has proposed Rule 146 which by its terms is inapplicable to second.
ary transactions. This raises a very serious question as to whether a security holder
may still make private placements. It appears that he should be so entitled since Rule
144 is intended to be non-exclusive. Also, what standards arc to be adhered to in
making any private placements? Apparently, the Commission and its staff must have
felt that to make Rule 146 specifically applicable to secondary transactions would
fly in the face of the statutory language of §4(2). On the other hand they may have
created a no-man's-land.
See also letter by Carl Schneider to SEC dated January 23, 1973:
The Release, page 2, states that the benefits of the Rule would not be available to
persons other than the issuer. This statement is very unfortunate in that it further
complicates an already complicated situation. Most lawyers are satisfied that a private
purchaser under certain circumstances may make a private resale without violating
Section 5 of the Act. However, the statutory exemption for such a transaction is high-
ly uncertain. Although Section 4(2) is generally considered to be the exemption cov-
ering private transactions, by its terms it relates only to transactions "by an issuer."
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although it could be argued that there is no statutory basis under § 4(2)
for such a rule," since § 4(2) by its terms exempts only "transactions by
an issuer."
The replacement problem is further complicated by Rule 1445 which
permits sales of
securities acquired directly or indirectly from the issuer thereof, or
from an affiliate of the issuer in a transaction or chain of transactions
not involving any public offering5O
subject to numerical and other restrictions. As originally adopted, Rule
144(e) (3) (g) excluded from the computation of the numerical limit
securities sold by the holder thereof "pursuant to an exemption provided
by Section 4(2) ."7 In February 1974, the phrase was amended to read
"in a transaction exempt pursuant to Section 4 of the Act and not in-
volving any public offering.""8 This was apparently a shift of position by
the staff of the SEC from the view that a replacement must find its
statutory authority in § 4(2); however, because of the failure to deal
with this problem in Rule 146 coupled with the above mentioned change
in Rule 144, there is no guidance on the standard for a replacement.
A hint is found in a no-action letter issued to Environmental Sciences
Corporation which suggests that such sales must be "similar" to § 4(2)
transactions.5 9 Many questions remain: To how many persons may each
Members of the staff have conceded in discussions that private purchasers may resell
privately (assuming that a pyramid effect does not result in a broad distribution to a
large number of persons), but there is conflict of opinion within the staff as to whether
Section 4(1) or 4(2) applies. The confusion was compounded by the enigmatic no-
action letter to Gadsby & Hannah, 169 SRLR C-2.
Considering the general purpose of the reform program of which Rule 146 is a
parr, it would be regrettable to leave this question unresolved. Something in the
Rule, or at least in the covering Release, should legitimize the applicability of one ex-
emption or another to private reales.
4The basis for the exemption under §4(1) is not clear either. The Section exempts
"transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter or dealer." Section 2(11) defines
an underwriter as a person who purchases securities from an issuer with a view to distribution
or participates in a distribution and defines "i 'suer" to include a person controlling the issuer.
Consequently, in a sale by a control person through a broker, the broker is an underwriter and
the transaction is not exempt. Wolfson v. United S:ates, 405 F.2d 779 (1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 946 (1969).
5 17 C.F.R. §230.144 (1972).
56 Rule 144 defines an affiliate of an issuer as "a person that directly, or indirectly through
one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with,
such issuer." 17 C.F.R. §230.144(a)(1) (1972). Thus, under the facts of the 1olf son case,
supra note 51, had the transaction otherwise been in conformity with Rule 144, the broker's
purchase from the defendant would not have constituted a distribution and the transaction
would have been exempt under §4(1) of the 1933 Act.
57 17 C.F.R. §230.144.
• 
5t Securities Act Release No. 33-5452 (Feb. 1, 1974).
9 Environmental Sciences Corporation, CCH FED. SEC. L REP. [1973 Transfer Binder]
579,466.
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restricted stockholder sell? Does the number depend upon the length
of the seller's holding period (e.g., more than the two years specified in
Rule 144) or the amount of securities to be sold? Do any suitability or
sophistication tests apply to private resales? Are there any requirements
on information to be supplied, and how can the seller obtain information
if he is not an insider?"' The unanimous view is that it is'urgent that this
matter be clarified.61
C. Paragraph (a): Definitions
The Rule is deceptively short and it is broken into eight paragraphs
lettered from (a) through (h). Paragraph (a) provides definitions, the
first of which is that of "offeree representative," a new concept in secu-
rities law. The offeree representative is defined as a person (and it is
clear that there may be more than one offeree representative) who
has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that
he either alone or together with other offeree representatives or the of-
feree is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective in-
vestment.
Ralston Purina never contemplated the concept of an investment repre-
Sentative. This, of course, ignores the reality of much venture capital
financing in the United States which is carried on through the private
fortunes of wealthy families assisted by their consultants and advisers.
In addition to his knowledge and experience, the offeree representative
must not have certain close relationships to the issuer; must be acknowl-
edged by the offeree in writing during the course of his transaction to be
his offeree representative; and must disclose to the offeree prior to the
acknowledgment any material relationships, existing or proposed, with
the issuer or its affiliates. It should be noted that the rule contemplates
that the offeree representative may be compensated by the issuer provided
that there is full disclosure. This is in accord with traditional investment
banking procedures in large debt placenients."
There are three notes to paragraph (a). The first note states that of-
feree representatives should consider the applicability of various registra-
tion and anti-fraud provisions relating to brokers and dealers under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and relating to investment advisers un-
der the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.":' The second requires specific
tit' See generally letter of Carl W. Schneider and Charles C. ZalI to SEC; Sec. Reg, and L.
Rev. #228 P. F-10; Nov. 21, 1973 thereinafter cited as Schneider.Zall Letter).
61 Id. See also, Schneider Letter, upra note 53; Wander and Shevitz, supra note 49: ind
Letter of Carl W. Schneider to Seturties and Exthange Conimissiun of Mard 1, l19'4.
62See WHITMAN, supra note 32 at 132; Schneider-Zall Letter, supra note 60.
6a 15 U.S.C. §80b-1 et seq. (11'70) (hereinafter cited as the 1940 Act).
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acknowledgment of the offeree representative as to each prospective in-
vestor. Advance blank acknowledgment such as "all securities transac-
tions" or "all private placements" is not sufficient. This will permit the
offeree to consider potential conflicts of interest with respect to each in-
vestment. The third states that disclosure of material relationships be-
tween the offeree representative or its affiliates and the issuer and its
affiliates does not relieve the offeree representative of its obligation to act
in the interests of the offeree. Perhaps the problems raised by the first
note are the "Catch-22:' of the whole concept. 4
The introduction of any new concept into law will usually raise as
many questions as it solves. Is there a requirement that the offeree rep-
resentative make a favorable recommendation or is an analysis sufficient?
In a recent speech, Alan B. Levenson, Director of Division of Corpora-
tion Finance of the SEC, 5 stated that under the rule there is no express
requirement for a recommendation but there is an implicit requirement for
communication. What are the due diligence duties of the offeree repre-
sentative?
One might approach the answer to this question by considering the
fact that the offeree himself has no due diligence obligations on his own
behalf. Alternatively, some of the cases involving negligent misrepresen-
tations by broker-dealers to their customers should be considered." Here,
due diligence requirements have been specifically imposed. It is urgent
that the due diligence obligations of the offeree representative be clarified
by an interpretative release.
Any civil liability of the offeree representative under the Act would
arise under §§ 12(2) and 17 (the anti-fraud section). Section 12(2)
establishes a negligence standard" for making untrue statements and for
';4 The Exchange Act and the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion promulgated pursuant to it impose certain registration and reporting requirements on
brokers and dealers, establish certain financial requirements, regulate a variety of fraudulent
practices, and through Regulations T. U and G'promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board. reg-
ulate extension of credit by brokers and dealers, as well as certain others. The 1940 Act
(supra note 63) includes registration record.keeping and reporting requirements for persons
who for compensa:ion advise others as to the value of securities or the advisability of investing
in, purchasing or Eelling securities. Both carry substantial criminal and civil penalties and ex-
pose violators to action by the SEC which could effectively prevent them from engaging in ac-
tivities involving securities.
65 Address by Alan B. Levenson at seminar on Private Placements: Implications of New
Rule 146, June 3, 1974.
6  Batchelor v. Legg Co., CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 593,119 (D. Md. 1971); Jee 4alo Hen-
dricks v. Flato Realty Investments, CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 592,290 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
67 Liability is imposed upon one who "shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did
not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known .... "
In certain cases a negligence standard may be imposed on offeree representatives under
Rule IOb-5 under the Exchange Act. For a recent and extreme statement of this view tee
Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 43 U.S.LW. 2120 (7th Cir., August 30, 1974) (auditor which
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omitting to disclose material information. If the offeree representative
acts solely on behalf of the buyer, § 12(2) would probably not be appli-
cable since it applies only to those who offer or sell securities. However,
if the offeree representative is found to have acted on behalf of seller
as well as buyer (and this may well be likely in many situations), then
liability may be imposed."8
If an officer or a partner of an investment banking firm acts as offeree
representative of an offeree and another partner serves on the board of the
issuer, will that make the investment banking firm an affiliate under sub-
paragraph (a) (1) (i) so as to disqualify it from acting as an offeree rep-
resentative? The answer to this question probably lies in the Martin-
Marietta case69 and the concept of deputization of board membership
there. If there is deputization so that in effect the investment banking
firm itself serves as the director then it would probably be disqualified
as an offeree representative. There will undoubtedly be concern as to
whether certain classes of persons automatically qualify as offeree repre-
sentatives: for example, lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers. If
a lawyer, must he be a securities or a tax lawyer? If an accountant, a
general accountant, tax accountant, or auditor? If an investment banker,
a salesman, corporate finance specialist, or analyst? For simplicity's sake,
it would be hoped that the Commission will consider automatically qual-
ifying such classes of persons as lawyers, accountants, and investment
bankers. 0
In any event, the Rule requires only that the issuer have "reasonable
grounds" to believe that a person qualifies as an offeree representative and
provides that the representative may have the requisite knowledge either
alone or together with the offeree or other representatives of the offeree.
The definition of the term "issuer" in subparagraph (a) (2) of the
negligently failed to uncover fraudulent scheme in statutory audit of brokerage house, as re-
quired by § 17(a) of the 1934 Act, may be liable to defrauded plaintiffs.)
08 3 L Loss, SEcuRITIEs REGULATION 1713 et seq., and Supplement. See The Johns
Hopkins University v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970) (broker whose agent omitted
to supply material information held liable under §12(2)). In Nicewarner v. Blevins, 244 V.
Supp. 261 (D. Col. 1965), the court stated:
It is well established that persons o:her than the owner of a security may be liable
under 12(1). Such persons include brokers or other agents for the seller, and direc-
tors, officers, or controlling persons of a corporation. However, in all instances
where a non-owner has been held liable, his conduct has amounted to solicitation of
the sale.
Id. at 266. Of course, §16 of the 1933 Act preserves the common law and state and feder.
ally imposed duties of offeree representatives (if any).
69 Feder v. Martin-Marietta Corporation, 406 F.2d 260 (2d Ci r. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1036 (1970).
70 Such an exemption is embodied in the definition of investment adviser under the 1940
Act, §201(11).
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rule incorporates the definition in § 2(4) of the Act.71 There is an ex-
clusion for securities issued by a trustee, receiver or debtor in possession
under the Bankruptcy Act-presumably to avoid integration with offer-
ings of securities issued by the debtor prior to the bankruptcy since secu-
rities issued by a trustee, receiver, or debtor in possession under the Bank-
ruptcy Act should be exempt under § 3 (a) (10) of the Act.-' To deal
with another problem of integration, the first draft of the Rule contained
a definition of the term "issuer" for certain offerings involving partner-
ships. In the SEC synopsis of the Rule it is noted:
This has been deleted from the Rule as adopted because it was ambig-
uous and the Commission determined that Rule 146 was not the appro.
priate place to deal with the question at this time.73
This problem often arises when developers in the tax shelter field, such as
real estate, oil and gas, or cattle, create successive limited partnerships to
sell securities to the public either in registered offerings or under § 4(2)
of the Act. If Rule 146 is not the proper place to bring certainty to the
area, it is hoped that the Commission will find another forum. The Com-
mission partially dealt with the problem in Regulation A by exempting
from the computation of securities offered pursuant thereto:
71 Section 2(4) of the 1933 Act provides that:
The term "issuer" means every person who issues or proposes to issue any secu-
rity; except that with respect to certificates of deposit, voting.trust certificates, or col-
lateral-trust certificates, or with respect to certificates of interest or shares in an unin-
corporated investment trust not having a board of directors (or perons performing
similar functions) or of the fixed, restricted management, or unit type, the term "is-
suer" means the person or persons performing the acts and assuming the duties of
depositor or manager pursuant to the provisions of the trust or other agreement or
instrument under which such securities are issued; except that in the case of an un-
incorporated assoda;ion which provides by its articles for limited liability of any or
all of its members, or in the cae of a trust, committee, or other legal entity, the trus-
tees or members thereof shall not be individually liable as issuers of any security
issued by the association, trust, committee, or other legal entity; except that with re-
spect to equipment-trust certificates or like securities, the term "issuer" means the per-
son by whom the equipment or property is or is to be used; and except that with re-
spect to fractional undivided interests in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, the term
"issuer" means the owner of any such right or of any interest in such right (whether
whole or fractional) who creates fractional interests therein for the purpose of public
offering.
72 Section 3(a) (10) of the Act:
(10) Any security which is issued in exchange for one or more bona fide out-
standing securities, claims or property interests, or partly in such exchange and partly
for cash, where the terms and conditions of such issuance and exchange are approved,
after a hearing upon the fairnes of such terms and conditions at which all persons
to whom it is proposed to issue securities in such exchange shall have the right to
appear, by any court, or hy any official or agency of the United States, or by any State
or Territorial banking or insurance commission or other governmental authority ex-
pressly authorized by law to grant such approval.
73 146 Release, supra note 46 at 15263; see note 79 and accompanying text.
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(4) In the case of an offering of interests in an unincorporated
theatrical production, interests in any affiiliated unincorporated theatrical
production; or
(5) In the case of an offering of interests in an unincorporated is-
suer organized to hold title to lease, operate, or improve specific real
property, interests in any affiliated issuer organized to hold title to, lease,
operate or improve other sp&ific real property.73a
In informal conversations, the staff of the Commission has indicated that
it does not presently have any project pending in this area.
The definition of the term "material" is based upon the opinion of
the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States.74  The
Court there said that materiality is to be determined from the reasonable
investor's point of view and not through some formula measuring the
importance of the transaction to the offeree representative or issuer.
D. Paragraph (b): Conditions To Be Met
Paragraph (b) of the Rule provides that transactions by an issuer
must be "made in accordance with all the conditions of this Rule," in
order to obtain the benefits of the Rule. In other words, the concept of
substantial compliance is not applicable. The difference between com-
plete compliance and substantial compliance may very well involve an
offeree to whom no sales of securities were made. Yet, under these cir-
cumstances (unless the burden of proof can be sustained that the offer-
ing qualified for the § 4(2) exemption outside the rule), it would be a
violation of the registration requirements of § 5 of the Act. When an
offering violates § 5, every purchaser is entitled to rescind his purchase
even though he receives complete and accurate information concerning the
issuer and the sale was in all other respects proper.7 Accordingly, an
issuer may, at the option of the purchasers, be required to return all of
the funds received in a private placement. Such return may result in fi-
nancial difficulties or disaster to the disadvantage of innocent stockholders
who invested in other offerings of the issuer or in that particular offer.
These types of infractions do not justify these consequences. Perhaps the
best solution to this problem is in the "I & I Defense," proposed by Carl
7 3 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (d) (1972).
74 406 U.S. 128 (1972) at 154.
75 Section 12 of the 1933 Act provides:
Any person who (1) offers or sells a security in violation oi wcthin 5 . shall he
liable to the person purchasing such security from him . . . [tor] the consideration
paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security....
In addition, con:rolling persons of the issuer may be personally liable under Section 15 of the
Act, and Section 24 provides for criminal penalties for willful violation.
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W. Schneider and Charles C. Zall. 06 In discussing the adoption of Rule
146 and Rule 147 they raise the question about the substantial civil liabil-
ity arising under § 12(1) of the Act for a § 5 violation which could result
from a failure to comply with any condition of either rule no matter how
innocent or immaterial. The consequences would include the right of any
purchaser of securities in the transaction to rescind his purchase or recover
damages notwithstanding the fact that the innocent and immaterial viola-
tion was not committed with respect to him. Schneider and Zall urge
that the SEC "adopt a rule creating an issuer's defense against Section
12(1) liability arising out of an innocent or immaterial failure to comply
with the terms of an exemption (the 'I & I Defense'). The rule should
apply to cases of 'substantial compliance' in 'good faith' ..... "
The Rule does not define the term "offering." The traditional theol-
ogy of "integration" has to be applied with all its attendant subjectivity.
An older SEC release remains the definitive statement:
A determination whether an offering is public or private would also
include a consideration of the question whether it should be regarded as a
part of a larger offering made or to be made. The following factors are
relevant to such question of integration: Whether (1) the different offer-
ings are part of a single plan of financing, (2) the offerings involve is-
suance of the same class of security, (3) the offerings are made at or
about the same time, (4) the same type of consideration is to be received,
(5) the offerings are made for the same general purpose.78
If an issuer effects an otherwise valid private offering and subse-
quently makes a public offering pursuant to a registration statement, then
the question may arise as to whether the two offerings are separate and
distinct or whether they constitute a single, integrated raising of funds.O
G6 Schneider and Zall, Section 12(1) and the Imperfect Exempt Transaction: The Proposed
I & I Defense, 28 Bus. LAw. 1011 (1973).
7 Id. at 1012.
7827 FED. REG. 11316, 11317 (1962); Securities Act Release No. 33.4552.
-9 On the matter of integration, see generally Goldberg, Private Placements and Restricted
Securities, 2 SECURITIES LAW SEPuEs (1973) at 2-133 et seq.; Haft, Tax Sheltered Invest-
ments, 4 SEcuRrrIEs LAW SERIES, (1973) at 2-9 et seq. (hereinafter cited as Haft); Shapiro
and Sachs, integration Under the Securities Act: Once an Exemption, Not Always ... , 31 MD.
L REV. 3 (1971). A problem often arises in considering whether two limited partnerships
with the same corporate general partner should be considered as one offering. Merely having
the same corporate general partner does not seem sufficient grounds to find integration. Letter
of Chief Counsel of Division of Corporation Finance to the National Association of Home
Builders, dated October 8, 1971, cited in Haft supra. But the two limited partnerships may
well con:ract for goods and services with the same entities many of which may be affiliates
of the general parmer. Assume that the two limited partnerships offer limited partnership in-
terests for cash at approximately the same time. In such a case, is the fact that the limited
partnerships are engaged in separate projects, as for example, different cattle herds, different
oil wells, or different apartment complexes, together with the separation of entities, sufficient
to prevent integration? Or should this be construed as a single plan of financing the business
of the corporate general partner, which should be viewed as the actual issuer of the securities,
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If the latter, the exemption is lost with respect to the' original private
offering. 0 Another example of the integration problem arises if an
offering is made partly to persons in the United States and partly to per-
sons in foreign countries, [then] the total number of offerees must be
considered in determining the availability of the exemption whether the
offering originates in this country or in the foreign country. For example,
if ABC, Inc., a Delaware corporation, makes a million dollar stock offer-
ing, part of which is purchased for investment by a selected group of 25
or less investment purchasers in this country and the remainder to 200 in
Canada, ABC, Inc., has made a public offering.81
To provide a safe harbor from the possibility of integration a concept
first proposed in Rule 147812 was continued in subparagraph b(1) of Rule
146:
an offering shall be deemed not to include offers, offers to sell, offers for
sale or sales of securities of the issuer pursuant to the exemptions pro-
vided by Section 3 or Section 4(2) of the Act or pursuant to a registra-
tion statement filed under the Act that, take place prior to the six month
period immediately preceding or after the six month period immediately
following any offers, offers for sale or sales pursuant to this Rule; pro-
vided, that there are during neither six month periods any offers, offers
for sale or sales of securities by or for the issuer of the same or similar
class as though offered, offered for sale or sold pursuant to the Rule.
It is' apparent that lawyers relying on the Rule to provide an exemp-
tion for an offering will have to qualify their opinion with respect to
subsequent offers or sales during the six month period following the sub-
ject sale which may destroy the use of the Rule.
E. Paragraph (c): Limitations On Manner Of Offering
In keeping with the concept that a transaction under the Rule must
be one "not involving any public offering," the Rule prohibits any form
of general solicitation or general advertising, specifically including news-
paper advertisements, articles, radio, and television. The concept of lim-
iting general solicitation becomes more sophisticated in dealing with
meetings, seminars, and direct written communication. Seminars are per-
mitted if the persons attending meet the requirements of subparagraph
rather than the limited partnership? Note, Application of the Serurities Doctrine of Integra
tion to Real Estate Syndicates, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 428, 454 (1973). Thest matters tre not
resolved by Rule 146.
8oSowards, Federal Securities Act 11 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS .44 1 kiIII', tU(AI A.
TION, § 4.02[1l (1973).
81 Id.
82 17 C.F.R. §230.147. For an analysis of Rule 147, see Gardiner, 'ntraltate OlJering :x,
emption: Rule 147-Progress or Stalemate?, 35 OHIO ST. L.J ;40 (1 9'14
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(d) (1) and with respect to persons qualifying only under subdivision
(d) (1) (ii), if such persons are accompanied by their offeree representa-
tive(s). With respect to a mailing program such as letters, circulars, or
otherwise, the communication must contain an undertaking to provide the
information specified by subparagraph (e) (1). This undertaking is ap-
plicable whether or not such person eventually becomes a buyer of the
securities offered.
One of the first staff no-action letters (or more properly, a refusal to
grant a no-action letter) relating to the Rule appeared in connection
with an inquiry stating that the issuer "proposed a 'blind advertisement'
that will appear in inflight publications" with respect to a proposed offer-
ing of oil and gas properties under the Rule.83 According to the issuer,
"the proposed advertisement is designed to identify individuals from what
[the issuer].. . . considers that largest potential participant group of mid-
dle and upper echelon business executives who frequently travel by air.'
It was the view of the staff that because of the proposed reliance of the
issuer upon the provisions of Rule 146 there appeared to be serious ques-
tions raised as to the availability of an exemption under § 4(2) of the Act
should the proposed advertisement contribute to an effort to find proposed
offerees of future privately sponsored programs.
F. Paragraph (d): Nature Of Offerees
Paragraph (d) on the nature of offerees, is essentially the grandson of
Ralston Purina out of Continental Tobacco. The major consideration is
the ability of the offerees to fend for themselves. It would be well be-
fore proceeding to further discussion of this paragraph to quote it in its
entirety.
(d) Nature of Offerees. The issuer and any person acting on its
behalf who offer, offer to sell, offer for sale or sell the securities shall have
reasonable grounds to believe and shall believe:
(1) immediately prior to making any offer, either:
(i) that the offeree has such knowledge and experience in financial
and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks
of the prospective investment, or
(ii) that the offeree is a person who is able to bear the economic risk
of the investment; and
(2) immediately prior to making any sale, after making reasonable
inquiry, either.
(i) that the offeree has such knowledge and experience in financial
and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks
of the prospective investment, or
-i that "ie offeree and his offeree representative(s) together have
- Damson Oil Corporation. BNA SEC. REG. & L REP. No. 261 at C-1 (July 17. 1974).
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such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that they
are capable of eyaluating the merits and risks of the prospective invest.
ment and that offeree is able to bear the economic risk of the investment.
It is apparent in comparing the language of subparagraph (d) (1)
with subparagraph (d) (2) that not every qualified offeree is a qualified
purchaser. Thus, we are dealing with a two step process: the qualifica-
tion of offerees and then sorting out from the qualified offerees the quali-
fied purchasers.
The language of subdivision (d) (1) (i) is deceptively simple but
raises substantial questions. Must the offeree be capable of specifically.
evaluating the business of the offeror or is general business experience
sufficient? If securities of a computer company are being offered would
a commercial banker or an investment banker be a qualified offeree or
must we find one who has worked in the computer section, of a metropoli-
tan bank or investment banking concern?
It has been suggested that the test in subparagraph (d) (1) is "more
demanding than court tests. Under those tests an investor who had access
to or was furnished with the requisite information would probably not
also have to be sophisticated. 8s4 The "economic risk" test contained in
subdivisions (d) (1) (i) and (ii) was seriously criticized by the bar prior
to the adoption of the rule. The Subcommittee on Private Offerings of
the Federal Securities Regulation Committee of the American Bar Asso-
ciation raised the question that if the offeree together with his offeree
representatives is able to fend for himself, why is it necessary to impose
the suitability requirement of being "able to bear the economic risk of
the investment.'-'-, The discussion of Charles S. Whitman III is very
much to the point:
What of the famous sophisticated gamblers? He knows all and is
able to fend for himself but goes deep into debt to take down some of
the deal anyway. What of the scientist for the company who thinks it
is another Haloid and throws everything he has, life savings and all, into
company stock? What proof will be required to establish ability to ab-
sorb the loss? If you have a net worth of $50,000, how much can you
afford to lose? Is it S50,000 or 8100,000? No one knows. The Divi-
sion has all these problems under consideration. It may be impossible
to cover them all under a single rule. It is hoped that whatever solution
is adopted, the strong nonexclusivity provision will protect the genuine
private placement even if it is one of these specialized types.,,"
The two step process of inquiry prior to making an offer presents
84 Wander and Shevitz, supra note 49 at 914.
85 Subcommittee Letter, supra note 53.
86 Whitman, supra note 32 at 135.
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substantial difficulty. Qualification of offerees is not an easy task in that
very few offerees are interested in furnishing their net worth statements to
offerors prior to the- making of an offer and the determination of their
interest in the proposed transaction. We might even speculate that some
offerees would be reluctant to furnish net worth statements even after
the making of the offer.
The determination of the time period becomes more difficult in deal-
ing with stock options and warrants. It would appear that the suitability
(if that is the meaning of subdivisions (d) (1) (i) and (ii)) require-
ments must be met not only at the time of the offer and the sale but also
at the time of the exercise. Probably § 3(a) (9) of the Acet would
provide an exemption for convertible securities so that the offeree would
not have to meet the test at the time of the conversion.
G. Paragraph (e): Access To Or Furnishing Of Information
We have noted above the development of the concept of "access" in
relation to the private placement exemption. It has become a ghost that
refuses to vanish. One commentator has suggested that the ghost be
exorcised by definition. Ralston Purina, according to this commentator,
should be interpreted as pointing to only two inquiries with respect to
theinitial sale: whether each offeree was "sophisticated" and whether each
had access to the same kind of information which registration would dis-
close.8 8 In this analysis, the access requirement could be met by an issuer
directly by furnishing each offeree appropriate information or indirectly
through presumptive accessYw-1 Presumptive access may be established cir-
cumstantially under alternative theories: either the offeree has such an inti-
mate association with the issuer that all sources of relevant information
are readily available or he has the power to coerce full disclosure. Never-
theless, the Commission felt constrained to continue the concept in a
somewhat watered-down fashion.90
Paragraph (e) of the Rule begins with a note explaining that:
Access can only exist by reason of the offeree's position with respect
to the issuer. Position means an employment or family relationship
8 Section 3(a) Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this tide shall not
apply to any of the following classes of securities:
(9) Any .ecurity exchanged by the issuer with its existing security holders where
no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for solicit-
ing such exchange ....
s8 Patton, The Private Offering: A Simplified Analysis of the Initial Placeneat, 27 Bus.
LAW. 1089 (1972) (hereinafter referred to as Patton).
89 Patton, supra note 88 at 1092.
90 See text accompanying notes 22 through 32.
19741
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
or economic bargaining power that enables the offeree to obtain infor-
mation from the issuer in order to evaluate the merits and risks of the
prospective investment.
It can be argued that access does not arise through economic bargaining
power. Any prospective purchaser of securities, no matter how small,
may refuse to purchase unless he has been furnished such information as
he may demand. If he should choose not to buy without the requested in-
formation, he obviously is not damaged.
In lieu of "access" the issuer must furnish each offeree or his offeree
representative(s), or both, information specified in Schedule A of the.
Act. In case of an issuer subject to the reporting requirements of the Ex-
change Act, a package consisting of the information contained in a regis-
tration statement on Form S-1 under the Act or on Forms 10 or 10-K un-
der the Exchange Act, whichever is more recently required to have been
filed, and the information contained in any definitive proxy statement 1
required to be filed under the Exchange Act, and any further reports re-
quired to be filed under the Exchange Act since the filing of such annual
report or registration statement is sufficient. It might be suggested that
the Commission by interpretive release should exclude from the last cate-
gory certain less significant documents, such as preliminary proxies0 2
and Schedule 13-D's. 3 There must also be included a brief description
of the securities being offered, the use of the proceeds from the offering
and any material changes in the issuer's affairs which are not disclosed
in the documents furnished.
Issuers not registered under the Exchange Act must furnish the in-
formation that would be required to be included in a registration state-
ment filed under the Act on the form which it would be entitled to use.
However, if the issuer does not have audited financial statements required
by such form and cannot obtain them without unreasonable effort or ex-
pense, the financial statements may be provided on an unaudited basis.
There is an exclusion for exhibits if they are otherwise made available.
The requirements above may seem simple enough but in practical ap-
plication they prove to be much more difficult. Registration statements
M1 Required by Rule 14a-3 (17 C.F.R. §240.14a-3) under the 1934 Att. The Report on
Form 10, the Annual Report on Form 10-K require similar infoxmation to business and man-
agement of issuers and, taken with the disclosures required by Item " of Schedule 14A (17
C.F.R. 240.14a-101), relating to remuneration and transactions %%ith affiliates, provide sub.
stantially the same information as Form S-1.
U2 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-6.
93 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-101. The form was establhshcd t, ,arr ,.t tht pt1ro wonsi ol I (d)
of the 1934 Act and must be filed by certain defincI p vr'os %%h0 atlulrr more than five per,
cent of any equity security of a class of stock reglatered pursuant to Section 12 of the 1931J Act,
17 C.F.R. 240.13d-1.
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contain pie charts, graphs,94 "Part II materials," 95 and financials prepared
in accordance with Regulation S-X. 0 An important section of most pro-
spectuses for venture companies is the one headed "Risk Factors."0D Vould
the omission of this section for a company subject to the reporting require-
ments of the Exchange Act be inherently misleading under Rule 10(b)-
5 ?98
In addition, prior to the sale, the offeree and his offeree representa-
tive, if any, must have the opportunity to obtain additional information
necessary to verify the accuracy of the information received, to the extent
the issuer has such additional information or can get it without unrea-
sonable effort or expense; and the opportunity to ask questions of and
receive answers from the issuer or any person acting on its behalf con-
cerning the terms and conditions of the offering. (We might speculate
on the inherent problems if, for example, the offeree and his offeree repre-
sentative should ask to review the issuer's projections.) 9" This informa-
tion need not be furnished to those offerees who are eliminated as pro-
spective purchasers unless an undertaking required by paragraph (c) (3)
was made in connection with a meeting or seminar. It is difficult to see
what purpose can be served by continuing to furnish this information. In
any event it should be noted that the offeree under Rule 146 receives far
greater privileges in this regard than an offeree of a registered offering.
Correlatively, the issuer does not have the protection from anti-fraud
charges inherent in restricting his communications to the written pro-
spectus as is the procedure in a registered offering.
Under the disclosure required by paragraph (e) (3), the issuer or any
person acting on behalf of the issuer must disclose to each offeree in writ-
ing prior to sale (i) any material relationship between his offeree repre-
sentative(s) or its affiliates and the issuer and its affiliates which then exist
or is mutually understood to be contemplated or which has existed any
time during the previous two years and any compensation received or to
be received as a result of such relation; (ii) that the purchaser of the
securities must bear the economic risk of investment for an indefinite
period because the securities have not been registered under the Act and
therefore cannot be sold unless they are subsequently registered under
the Act or an exemption from such registration is available; and (iii)
94 Guide 6 of Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, 33 FED. REG.
18617 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Guides).
95 Part II of Form S-1, CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 37124.
q0 17 C.F.R1 § 210.1-01 et. seq. (1974).
97 See, e.g. Guide 55 and Proposed Guide 60 of Guides, supra note 94.
98 17 C.F.R. §240.ob-5.
9 S'Levy v. Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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the fact that there will be restrictions on the disposition of securities
which will be noted thereon.
H. Paragraph (f): Business Combinations
One must approach this section of the Rule with a sense of history.
Prior to Continental Tobacco and Rule 133, 91 business combinations pre-
sented one of the easier opinions a securities lawyer was called upon to
give. Rule 133 provided in substance that the distribution of securities
in a tax free reorganization under §§ 368(a) (1) (A) or (C) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 did not constitute a sale of securities and
therefore registration was not required. In 1954, it was broadened by the
adoption of an amendment providing for the "leakage" of securities ac-
quired in the business combination by affiliates of the acquired company
who were permitted to dispose of a limited amount of securities in every
six month period. As long as Rule 133 held sway, no one worried about
the availability of the private offering. exemption in acquisition transac-
tions. Quite the contrary, everything was done to avoid this section be-
cause the Commission had carved out an exception to Rule 133 called
the "negotiated transaction." Essentially, the "negotiated transaction" the-
ory was that if the numbers of shareholders of the acquired company were
few then the "sale" was not effected by the vote of the shareholders but
rather by negotiations between the acquiring company and each of the
few sellers. It was assumed that if one failed to qualify under Rule 133,
the § 4(2) exemption would be automatically available. The differ-
ence was that under Rule 133, non-affiliates of the acquired company
could immediately re-sell the securities and even affiliates had the leak-
age provisions available to them. Under § 4(2) the acquired securities
were locked up for as much as three years.
The Wheat Report"" led to the repeal of Rule 133 by the substitu-
tion of Rule 145101 and Continental Tobacco was decided at about the
same time. Rule 145 treats a business combination as a sale of securities.
It was in this context that Rule 146 was adopted. The consensus
seemed to be that it did not treat business combinations too kindly al-
though in the final version some improvements were made over earlier
kroposals.1 °2
Paragraph (f) carves out an exception to the paragraph (d) require-
99 17 C.F.R. §230.133.
100 F. WHEAT, DisCLOSURE TO INVESTORS (1968).
101 17 C.F.R. § 203.145. For a discussion of Rule 145 !ee Schneider and Manko, Rule 143,
An Analysis andApprasal, 5 REV. SEC. REG. 811 (1972), 6 REV. Srac. REG. 991 (1913) (here.
inafter cited as Schneider and Manko).
102 Id.
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ments as to the nature of the offerees for business combinations. It also
eliminates the provision requiring the purchaser to furnish an invest-
ment letter. 103 In subparagraph (f) (3), the Rule requires that:
[The] issuer (and any person acting on his behalf), after making rea-
sonable inquiry, shall have reasonable grounds to believe, and shall be-
lieve, at the time that any plan for a business combination is submitted
to security holders for their approval, that each offeree either alone or
with his offeree representative(s) has such knowledge and experience
in financial and business matters that he is or they are capable of evalu-
ating the merits and* the risks of the prospective investment.
The issuer is required by subparagraph (f) (4) to provide in writing to
each offeree at the time the plan is submitted to security holders for ap-
proval, information about any special terms or arrangements of the pro-
posed transaction relating to any security holders.
It should be noted, first of all, that the requirement that the offeree
be able to bear the economic risk of investment has been eliminated from
paragraph (f). The Commission's comments regarding subparagraph
(f) (3) demonstrate an awareness of the difficulties that may be created
by the requirement that each offeree either meet the required sophistica-
tion standards or have an offeree representative:
Subparagraph (f) (3) means that an offeree who needs an offeree
representative in order to satisfy the knowledge and experience test, and
who refuses to have one, may make the Rule unavailable for the trans-
action. Numerous comments on this point were received in response to
a similar condition in the Rule as last proposed. Although the Com-
mission is aware of the possible problems this may cause, the Commis-
sion does not believe that it can allow satisfaction of the state corporate
law requirements as to business combinations to replace satisfaction of
the federal securities laws.104
In effect, the Commission has said that the generally accepted provision
of corporate law relating to the right of holders of a majority or two-thirds
of the shares to determine the future of the corporation is overridden by
Rule 146 so that a recalcitrant minority may frustrate an acquisition or
force alteration of its terms in order to specially benefit itself. This
problem was ably dealt with by various commentators on earlier versions
of the Rule. Especially to the point are the comments of Schneider
and Manko:
[S]tate law does not assure all . . . [stockholders of the acquired com-
pany] that they will receive a suitable security when their company is
acquired. Quite to the contrary, the will of the specified majority (typi-
:03 Required by Subparagraph h(4) of Rule 146.
104 146 Release, supra note 46.
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cally a simple majority or two-thirds) binds all stockholders, their only
alternative being appraisal right in some instances. This fundamental
ground rule of state law, and the inherent risks assumed by each stock-
holder when he makes an investment .. . , indeed should not be over-
ridden by the 1933 Act, a federal law oriented toward disclosure. As
indicated above, Rule 146 might well give undue leverage to a recalci-
trant minority to frustrate acquisition, to alter its terms or to force spe-
cial treatment for itself (e.g., a cash buyout).105
It was somewhat loosely contemplated when the Rule was adopted
that the stockholders of the acquired company might very well desig-
nate the management of their company or one of its officers as their of-
feree representative. In this connection, it should be noted that the
management group or even its counsel in many situations may not pos-
sess the necessary degree of sophistication. This does not mean however
that they will not be able to-perceive the value of the shares of say, an
AT&T or a General Motors in exchange for their own. Also, the man
agement group may be unwilling to accept the relationship, first because
of liability they would be assuming and second because there often 'would
be conflicts of interest between their own personal interests (as in con-
tinued employment) and those of minority stockholders. Serious ques-
tions may be raised as to the applicability of the offeree representative
concept to the business combination situation.
An appropriate solution to the offeree representative problem would
be to eliminate the requirement of an offeree representative for business
combinations,' 00 and to require officers and directors to disclose to share.
holders any interest they may have in the proposed combination at the
time they recommend it. Protection of minority shareholders would be
left to the antifraud statutes and general.common law duties of direc-
tors'07 and the majority shareholders.'"'
Paragraph (f) does not apply to an exchange of securities for secu-
rities. Yet, even in the exchange situation, the acquiring corporation most
take shareholders of the acquired corporatibn as it finds them. In com-
ments to the Rule, it is noted that "in an exchange offer the issuer has a
choice of offerees and therefore does not need the special provisions of
paragraph (f)." If there are thirty-five stockholders in the acquired cor-
poration, thirty of whom meet the tests of paragraph (f) (3) and five
who do not, what are the issuer's choices? To exchange securities with
the thirty and attempt a "force-out merger" for the balance? Even here
105 Schneider and Manko, supra note 101, at 994.
106 Id. at 995.
107 For a general discussion of these duties see 3 \V. FLEITCAit. CY( LUI'1111A O1 rll LA\v
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 838 (perm. ed. 1965) and cases cited.
108 See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
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the corporation must comply with Rule 146. To exchange with the
thirty and leave a minority, or to register securities for the benefit of the
recalcitrant five who may prefer not to read the prospectus?
the application of paragraph (e) (Access To or Furnishing Infor-
mation) to business combinations is especially difficult. Access on the
part of all of the acquired corporation's stockholders to their own com-
pany cannot be assumed. The careful purchaser for his own protection,
will undoubtedly assume the contrary. Under Rule 145, the stockholders
of the acquired company are entitled to full information about both com-
panies, the issuer and their own company. In addition, they are entitled
to pro forma combined financial information.10 9 In the case of the large
public company acquiring a small private one, much of this information
would be meaningless.
I. Paragraph (g): Number Of Purchasers
The private placement exemption has always been surfeited with num-
bers. In 1935, it was stated that:
The opinion has been previously expressed by this office that an of-
fering to not more than approximately 25 persons is not an offering to
a substantial number and presumably does not involve a public offer-
ing... You will note that this does not mean the number of actual pur-
chasers but the number of persons to whom the security in question is
offered for sale.110
As a result of this opinion, the rule that no more than twenty-five of-
ferees would not result in a public offering became firmly imbedded in
the consciousness of those dealing with securities law.
In Ralston Purina, the issue is raised by both sides as to the defen-
dant's contention that its offer was confined to a select group. The Su-
preme Court responded that this was irrelevant as "the statute would seem
to apply to a 'public offering' whether to a few or many.""1 On the
other hand, in the same case the SEC attempted to persuade the Court
that apart from other criteria there should be a limitation in the appli-
cation of the exemption to a relatively few persons. The Supreme Court
rejected the contention saying:
[Nothing] prevents the commission, in enforcing the statute, from using
some kind of numerical test in deciding when to investigate particular
exemption claims. But there is no warrant for superimposing a quantity
limit on private offerings as a matter of statutory interpretation. 12
l09 Item 15 of Schedule 14A (17 C.F.R. §240.14a-101).
110 Release 285, supra note 10.
111346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
112 Id.
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The SEC spent the next several years trying to retreat from its "25 of.
ferees" position. In a 1962 release, the Commission said:
It should be emphasized therefore that the number of persons to
whom the offering is extended is relevant only to the question where they
have the requisite association with and knowledge of the issuer which
make the exemption available.' 13
The concept of Rule 146 was first spelled out by the Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, William Casey, on August 15, 1972,
in an address to the Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law
of the American Bar Association. 114  Thirty-five buyers were suggested
as the appropriate numerical limitation. Chairman Casey noted that
thirty-five was also the maximum number of non-institutional purchasers
permitted by the proposed ALI Federal Securities Code," 5 and the maxi-
mum number of purchasers permitted by the proposed legislation sub-
mitted by the SEC to regulate offerings in the oil and gas industry. n'1
Paragraph (g) of the Rule begins "(1) There shall be no more than
35 purchasers of the securities of the issuer from the issuer in any offering
pursuant to the Rule." The Rule as originally proposed1 provided that
not more than 35 persons in any consecutive 12 months period shall pur-
chase securities of the issuer in transactions pursuant to the Rule or not
pursuant to the Rule but in reliance upon § 4(2). The changes that de-
veloped were a significant improvement. The rolling 12 month period
concept was eliminated and the concept of the "offering" substituted. The
paragraph goes on to provide specific provisions for determining who are
purchasers. For the purposes of computing the number of purchasers,
some purchasers would be excluded: relatives, spouses and relatives of
spouses who live in the same home with the purchaser; trusts, estates,
and corporations of which the purchaser is substantially the sole bene-
ficiary or stockholder; and a person who purchases or agrees in writing to
purchase for cash in a single payment or in installments, securities of the
issuer in the aggregate amount of $150,000 or more. Paragraph (g)
goes on to note that corporations, partnerships, and similar entities may
be counted as a single purchaser unless they were organized for the spe-
cific purpose of acquiring the securities offered. Although the release
accompanying the Rule provides no explanation for the exception for
purchasers of $150,000 or more of securities, it was apparently designed
11327 FED. REG. 11316 (1962).
114 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 165 at F-1 (August 16, 1972) (hereinafter cited as
Casey).
"15 ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (Tent. Draft # 1, 1972).
116 The Oil and Gas Investment Act of 1973, S. 1050, 93rd Colg., 1st Sess. (1973).
11 See note 42, supra.
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to permit an unlimited number of institutional investors. In Chairman
Casey's August 1972 address, 18 a $50,000 to $100,000 standard for ex-
emption from numerical limitation was suggested. This later rose to
$250,000 in the proposed Rule. In contrast, the proposed Federal Securi-
ties Code adopted an exemption for "institutional investors""19 without
regard to the dollar amount purchased.
Preliminary note 5 (much to the surprise of commentators) reversed
an old SEC position on discretionary accounts exemplified by a "no-ac-
tion" letter by Baldwin B. Bane, stating that a trustee with forty-four
discretionary accounts would be considered one person in counting in-
vestors under the private placement exemptions.1 -0
J. Paragraph (h): Limitations On Disposition
This portion follows the historic trend of the SEC with respect to
limitations on dispositions, 1- requiring reasonable inquiry to determine if
the purchaser is acquiring securities for his own account or on behalf of
other persons, a restrictive legend on the stock certificate, stop-transfer
instructions and an agreement signed by the purchaser that the securities
will not be sold without registration under the Act or an exemption there-
from. The explanatory material contained in the release states "[t]he
Commission believes that these limitations are necessary in order to pro-
tect the public from a deferred distribution." The accompanying note
points out that in the business combination situation described in para-
graph (f), the written agreement is not required. This obviously is so
that one recalcitrant party to a business transaction would not be in a
position to block the entire transaction.
Stepping back and looking at paragraph (h) from a distance, we
might well ask whether if, in fact, no distribution has taken place, should
failure to comply with any part of paragraph (h) (remember that "all
the conditions of this Rule" must be complied with) defeat compliance
with the Rule or whether the Commission at this point has put the pre-
mium on paper work and lawyering at the expense of substance.
III. A TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS
It may be helpful to consider the application of the Rule to a hypo-
thetical transaction and the documentation that may be required. For this
purpose, let us assume that we have a subdivision (d) (1) (ii) offeree,
118 Casey, supra note 114.
111 Discussed infra at "2
320 Whitman, .upra note 43 at 136-37.
121See 27 FED. REG. 11316 (1962).
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i.e. an offeree who "does not have such knowledge and experience in
financial and business matters so that he is capable of evaluating the merits
and risks of a prospective investment." We are approaching the Rule
from the transactional point of view. We shall be carefully mindful of
the Commission's admonition (Preliminary Note 35) that:
[In] order to obtain the protection of the Rule, all its conditions must
be satisfied and the issuer claiming the availability of the Rule has the
burden of establishing, in an appropriate forum, that it has satisfied
them. The burden of proof applied with respect to each offeree as well
as each purchaser .... "
(1) Assuming no "access," the issuer must be prepared to provide
an offering circular that complies with subparagraphs (e) (1) and (2).
(2) The issuer (and any person acting on his behalf) must obtain
documentary evidence prior to making any offer that the proposed offeree
is a person who is able to bear the economic risk of the investment. This
will require a questionnaire and financial statements. Subparagraphs (d)
(1) and (2).
(3) The issuer cannot proceed to make a sale to such offeree until
the offeree designates his offeree representative in writing. Subparagraphs
(a)(1) and (3).
(4) The issuer must document the fact that the offeree representa-
tive meets the conditions of subparagraphs (a) (1) and (2), i.e. that the
offeree representative is not an affiliate, director, officer, or other employee
of the issuer or beneficial owner of 10%I4 or more of any class of the equity
securities' or 10' or more of the equity interest in the issuer except where
the offeree is related to such person by blood, marriage or adoption, no
more remotely than first cousin and further e~cepting any trust or corpora-
tion with respect to which persons with the specified relationship are the
sole beneficiaries or equity security holders. Subparagraphs (a) (1) and
(2), of course, provide that the offeree representative either alone or
together with other offeree representatives or with the offeree is capable
of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment. This
will require a suitable questionnaire.
(5) The issuer must further document that the offeree representative
has made the disclosure required by subparagraph (a) (1) (4) with re-
spect to material relationships with the issuer.
(6) The issuer must now furnish to the offeree and his offeree rep.
resentative the information specified in subdivision (e) (1) (ii).
(7) The issuer should document compliance with subparagraph (e)
(2) with respect to the opportunity to ask questions and receive answers
concerning the terms and conditions of the offer. This documentation
[Vol, 35
SECURITIES
should be carefully maintained not only for the purposes of assuring
compliance with subparagraph (e)(2) but also the various anti-fraud
provisions of § 10(b) and Rule iob-5 of the Exchange Act and §§ 12(2)
and 17(a) of the Securities Act.
(8) The issuer must disclose in writing to the offeree prior to sale
the matters set forth in subdivisions (e) (3) (i), (ii), and (iii) which
relate to the relationship of the issuer to the offeree representative, that
the offeree must bear the economic risk of the investment for an indefi-
nite period of time because the securities have not been registered under
the Act and the limitations on disposition of the securities because of the
fact that they are restricted securities.
(9) If an undertaking has been given pursuant to subparagraph
(c) (3), then even though the offeree determines not to purchase he still
must be provided in writing with appropriate information.
(10) The issuer must document the number of purchasers so that
there are not more than thirty-five purchasers as provided in paragraph
(g) using the methods of computation provided in subparagraph (g) (2).
Satisfactory documentation must be maintained with respect to any cor-
poration, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust or unincor-
porated organization that is a purchaser that such entity was not orga-
nized for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered if there is
any question about the number of purchasers. Subdivision (g) (2) (ii).
(11) The issuer must document the "reasonable inquiry to deter-
mine if the purchaser is acquiring the securities for his own account or on
behalf of other persons." Subparagraph (h) (1).
(12) The issuer must place a legend on the certificate for the se-
curities purchased stating that the securities have not been registered
under the Act and setting forth restrictions on transferability. Subpara-
graph (h) (2).
(13) The issuer must issue the appropriate stop-transfer instructions
to the transfer agent and, of course, maintain a record of the issuance of
such securities. Subparagraph (h) (3).
(14) The issuer must obtain from the purchaser a written agree-
ment that the securities will not be sold without registration under the
Act or exemption therefrom. Subparagraph (h) (4).
This list does not include the usual accouterments of a securities
transaction such as the subscription agreement, counsel's opinion, or di-
rectors' resolution. A sophisticated purchaser will undoubtedly desire a
purchase agreement containing appropriate representations relating to the
business and financial affairs of the issuer, representations that the trans-
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action is in compliance with the Rule and more detailed representations
relating to the "safe harbor" integration rules in subparagraph (b) (1).
Compare these complexities with the American Law Institute's project
for a completely new statutory approach for federal securities law, for
which Professor Louis Loss is the Reporter. The private offering exemp-
tion is approached with beautiful simplicity. Section 27 of Tentative
Draft Number 1 of the Federal Securities Code 2 .provides an exemption
for a "limited offering" which is defined as an offering in which (a) the
initial buyers of the securities are institutional investors and not more than
thirty-five other persons, (b) resales of any securities before three years
(or one year in the case of certain issuers who have filed with the SEC)
after the last sale to any of the initial buyers do not result in more than
thirty-five owners of those securities (apart from institutional investors
and persons who become owners otherwise than by purchase) at any one
time, and (c) the original offeror and all subsequent sellers have complied
with rules relating to restrictions on transfer. General advertising is pro-
hibited in connection with the distribution but not as a condition prece-
dent to the exemption. Questions of disclosure and suitability are left to
the general anti-fraud provisions of the Federal Securities Code.
IV. SECTION 4(2) OUTSIDE OF THE RULE
What is the present status of the private placement exemption outside
of the Rule? As we have noted earlier, the Rule is not exclusive. "Issuers
willing to rely on that exemption [§ 4(2)] may do so by complying with
administrative and judicial interpretations in effect at the time of the
transaction."
Since the risk of inadvertent failure to comply with the Rule is so
great, attention is now being focused on what is left of the § 4(2) ex-
emption outside the Rule. Thus, in an article immediately prior to the
adoption of the Rule, it was said:
[A]s has been generally recognized, however, extremely broad dicta in
Commission as well as court cases leave considerable doubt as to whether
the exemption outside of the Rule remains viable. There are certain re-
quirements repeatedly announced, for example, the fact that all of the
offerees must have a prior relationship with each other, which simply do
not reflect prevailing commercial practice or the policy considerations
underlying the Act ... accordingly, if the Rule is adopted, an interpreta-
tive release should redefine the general scope of the exemption outside
of the Rule. Such a release should note the essential features to estab-
lish the exemption, and should eliminate as sine qua non factors the non-
essential secondary features which have crept into the dicta . 1
I22ALI, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 227 (Tent. Draft # 1, 1972).
123 Schneider-Zall Letter, supra note 60.
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Members of the Securities Act Subcommittee, Federal Regulation of Secu-
rities Committee, under the guidance of Carl \W. Schneider are presently
considering a project wherein the Committee might formulate its own
comments on the residual law which would then be published for the
general guidance of the bar. In this work, four factors were identified-
as the important elements of the existing residual law:
(1) The offerees are appropriately qualified.
(2) The manner of the offering is appropriately limited.
(3) The offerees either have independent access to information
about the issuer or are supplied with information about the issuer. The
information should be significant in scope but need not conform to all
the full detailed requirements of a Form S-1 registration statement.
(4) There is no public redistribution of the securities sold in the
transaction so that the transaction as a whole constitutes a public dis-
tribution.1 24
It is interesting to test this formulation in the light of an example
given by one objecting member:
In order to try to make clear why I have a fundamental objection to
this formulation, I would like to suggest for your consideration the fol-
lowing case. Two electronic engineers working for one of the aero-
space companies in Los Angeles desire to form a new corporation to
manufacture equipment. Each of them has a Ph.D. in Physics and 15
years experience in the business. They need an additional $50,000 in
cash to launch their enterprise and one of them decides to approach his
aunt in Minneapolis, by whom he was raised after his parents' death
when he was four years old and who is now a widow that inherited
$150,000 from her husband when he died. She takes $50,000 out of
her savings and loan association in which she has the $150,000 depos-
ited and gives it to them for one-third of the stock and each of them also
takes one-third of the stock, whether with or without some promotional
factor in connection with the amount of their cash investment.
It is my opinion that a rule which would say that a registration must
be filed and a prospectus delivered to Aunt Minnie before this transac-
tion can be accomplished (or even an offering circular under Regulation
A) cannot be labeled other than insane. I also have no question in my
mind but that this transaction qualifies for the private offering exemp-
tion and always has and always will, despite the dicta by various courts,
which you rightly criticize as being unsupported by any actual decisions.
Yet it would completely fail to meet at least two of your four "sine
qua nons."'
125
Somewhere out there is a private placement exemption under § 4(2)
even though Rule 146 has not been complied with.
124 Letter of Carl W. Schneider to The Members of the 1933 Act General Subcommittee
of June 5, 1974.
325 Letter of Harold Marsh, Jr. to Carl W. Schneider, dated June 20, 1974.
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Prior to the adoption of the Rule, the staff of the SEC had a format
for responses to requests for no-action letters relating to the availability
of the § 4(2) exemption that went approximately as follows:
The staff is unable to say whether the Section 4(2) exemption is avail-
able to this company's offering of its securities since tht exemption dc-
pends upon a factual determination the staff cannot make as to whether
the prospective offerees meet the SEC v. Ralston Purina tests. 120
A recent no-action letter by the staff of the SEC 127 suggests that the
staff of the Commission is itself re-examining its thinking in this whole
area. The no-action letter involved a public sale of pledged securities in
order to conform with the notice of reasonableness requirements of §
9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code. It was proposed that the shares
be publicly offered and that notice of such sale be published in the news-
papers. The shares would be sold only as a block, the purchaser would
be required to give an investment letter, shares would be legended, and
a stop-transfer order would be noted in the stock transfer books. Pro-
spective purchasers would be restricted to persons who had been furnished
with adequate information about the issuer, were sophisticated purchasers
and would not purchase with a view to resale or distribution. The coun-
sel requesting the no-action letter concluded his letter by stating that
that transaction could be viewed "as a public offering leading to a private
sale in which there is no practical need for registration or where the pub-
lic benefits of registration are too remote to require registration." The
staff responded that it would not recommend any action to the Commis-
sion if the proposed transaction is effected without compliance with § 5
of the Act:
However, this view is contingent upon the additional condition that
the notice of sale include the following provisions. the securities may
be sold to only one individual purchaser for his own account and not
as a representative of purchasers other than himself and that the pur-
chaser may not resell the securities publicly without compliance with the
registration provisions of the Act."' 8
It is interesting to note that the offers will be made publicly and that
120 Kenai Air Service, Inc., avail. 2/4/74; see also Associated Developers of Florida, Inc.,
avail. 3/1/74; Service Life Insurance Company of Omaha, avail. 3/4/74; Thermal Compo-
nents, Inc., avail. 3/14/74; Woodland Beach Resort, Inc., avail. 3/18/74; Southwest Canners,
Inc., avail. 3/28/74; AutoBale America Corp., avail. 4/8/- i, National Basketball 'riner
Assn., avail. 4/10/74; Amgo, Inc., avail. 4/10/74; All Points Home Purchase Corp., avail.
4/12/74; Alyeska Equipment Corp., avail. 4/17/74; Americai Guarant) Finandul Corp. Ad-
ministration Trust Co., avail. 4/29/74.
12 Elwill Development Limited, avail. 8/1j/74, BNA SI".. Ri:G. No. 205 at C4I (Au.
gust 28, 1974).
128 Id.
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there are no restrictions on the number of offerees. This letter suggests
that the staff of the SEC has reversed the practice of counting offerees.
It should be further noted that not only are the number of offerees not
limited but obviously they need not have a relationship to on6 another,
be of a particular class or be of a class that has a particular relationship-
with the issuer. On the other hand, the number of purchasers is limited
to one. It is difficult to determine the theoretical basis for this limita-
tion. It is possible that this no-action letter could be significant as re-
flecting a major shift in emphasis; on the other hand, it may prove to be
an isolated response to an unusual situation.
What is a simpler solution? The literal language of the Act exempts
"transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering" from the
registration requirements of § 5. Despite the language of Viscount Sum-
ner,12 9 we know that one person is not a public.
It is the author's view that the present status of the private placement
exemption can only be improved by disregarding some of the dicta in
Ralston Purina and perhaps returning full circle to the famous letter of
the General Counsel released January 24, 1935 (when the Act was young).
Let us review and note some extracts from that letter:
Furthermore, the opinion has been expressed that under ordinary dr-
cumstances an offering to not more than approximately tventy-five per-
sons is not an offering to a substantial number and presumably does not
involve a public offering .... [A]gain, in determining what constitutes a
substantial number of offerees the basis on which the offerees are selected
is of greatest importance. Thus, an offering to a given number of per-
sons chosen from the general public on the ground that they are possible
purchasers may be a public offering even though an offering to a larger
number of persons who are all members of a particular class, member-
ship in which may be determined by the application of some pre-existing
standard, would be a non-public offering .... [I]f the denomination of
the units are such that only an insubstantial number of units is offered,
presumably no public offering would be involved .... I feel that trans.
actions which are effected by direct negotiations by the issuer are much
more likely to be non-public than those effected through the use of the
machinery of public distribution.130
The author feels that if we could start all over and develop the law from
this point appropriate guidelines could be developed for the non-public
offering exemption. The touchstones should be: (1) is a public offering
involved (number of offerees, class of offerees, etc.) and (2) is there a
1 9 The public ... is of course a general word. No particular numbers are prescribed.
Anything from two to infinity may serve: perhaps even one, if be is intended to be
the first of a series of subscribers, but makes further proceedings needless by him-
self subscribing the whole. [1929] A.C. 158, 169.
130 Release 285, rupra note 10.
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practical need for the application of the Act or are the public benefits too
remote (i.e. do we really want the public and private expense of registra-
tion for a single sale to Aunt Minnie.)
What is needed is a re-reading of Ralston Purina. What the Supreme
Court really said was "absent such a showing of special circumstances,
employees are just as much members of the investing 'public' as any other
neighbors in the community." The Supreme Court was dealing with a
situation in which there were from 400 to 1,000 purchasers of stock in a
space of three years and offers to sell to 500 (sales were stopped by the
litigation) in the fourth year. Of course, these 1,000 employees are
members 'of the investing public and sales to them constitute a public of-
fering. We can easily sympathize with the Court's decision. The Court
did not have before it the question of whether sales to thirty-five artists,
bake shop foremen, chow loading foremen, clerical assistants, copywriters,
electricians, stock clerks, mail office clerks, order credit trainees, production
trainees, stenographers and veterinarians over a space of three years would
have constituted a public offering. Despite the Court's language that
"an offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is
a transaction not involving any public offering" and "the focus of inquiry
should be on the need of the offerees for the protections afforded by reg-
istration," we suggest the court would have reached the conclusion, under
those circumstances, that "the public benefits are too remote," and that a
sale by an issuer to thirty-five of its employees was a transaction "by an
issuer not involving any public offering."
V. COMMENTS
The ghost of Ralston Purina haunts Rule 146. One yearns for a
simpler solution. Are the complicated processes of registration necessary
in order for a young man to secure his relatives' investment in his busi-
ness? Aren't the "public benefits" too remote? There are, of course,
other safeguards in our various state and federal securities laws. Most
states regulate the sale of securities in some manner. Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act effectively deal with misrepresentation,
material omission, and fraudulent courses of conduct. The wisdom of
Louis Loss employed in § 227 of the proposed Federal Securities Code
is the most clear-cut objective solution yet suggested. It will undoubtedly
require legislative sanction. The SEC, given its present posture, vis-,-vis
Ralston Purina, will probably not replace Rule 146 in this manner. It is
to be hoped that the adoption of the ALI Federal Securities Code will not
be too many years in the future.
During the interim period, one measure of relief that may be provided
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from the strictures of Rule 146 is found in the exemptive powers of the
SEC set forth in § 3 (b) of the Act.' 3 ' In the past, the Commission has
exempted public offerings of securities up to the $500,000 limit under the
provisions of Regulation A132 and the sale of fractional interests in oil
and gas rights to $250,000 under the provisions of Regulation B. 3 3 Sev-
eral special kinds of securities, such as first lien notes,' securities of co-
operative housing corporations,' 3" and securities to provide funds in lieu
of issuing fractional shares or scrip certificates,' have also been ex-
empted. Regulation A requires an offering circular that closely approxi-
mates a prospectus under § 5 of the Act. Regulation B requires a special
questionnaire to be answered which may be prepared without the ser-
vices of one skilled in the obscure art of securities writing. Regulation
257, relating to offerings that do not exceed $50,000, dispenses with the
offering circular entirely.
Section 3(b) provides power to grant the exemption if the Commis-
sion "finds that the enforcement of this title with respect to such securities
is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors
by the reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the
public offering." Until recently there has been little attention paid to the
phrase "limited character of the public offering." On June 3, 1974, the
SEC proposed Rule 240.13' The proposed Rule provides a transactional
exemption from § 5 of the Act by reason of § 3(b) of the Act.
In substance, Rule 240 is only available to corporate issuers. There
can be no general advertising or commissions paid for sales. The ag-
gregate sales price of all securities of the issuer (with very limited
exceptions) under the Rule or otherwise without registration cannot ex-
ceed $100,000 in twelve months. There can be no more than twenty-
five persons that purchase from the issuer and no more than fifty benefi-
cial owners of securities of the issuer after consummation of the sale.
Resales are limited and a notice is required to be filed with the regional
1-31 The Commission may from time to time by its rules and regulations and subject
to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed therein, add any class of securities
to the securities exempted as provided in this section, if it finds that the enforcement
of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public interest
and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the
limited character of the public offering; but no issue of securities shall be exempted
under this subsection where the aggregate amount at which such issue is offered to
the public exceeds $500,000.
132 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-62.
133 17 C.F.R. § 230.300-46.
134 17 C.F.R. § 230.234.
135 17 C.F.R. § 230.235.
136 17 C.F.R. § 230.236.
137 Securities Act Release No. 33-5499 (June 3, 1974), 39 FED. REG. 20609 (1974).
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office of the Commission within ten days prior to the first sale. By this
brief summary, it may be perceived that proposed Rule 240 is very lim-
ited in scope and possible benefit.The SEC should look to § 3(b) as an appropriate statutory sanction
for § 227 s 8 of the proposed Federal Securities Code and put it into effect
without waiting for the passage of the many years that necessarily will
take place'before Congress will enact it. This would provide a procedure
for making a private offering that would not require the "Wall Street"
sophistication inherent in the provisions of Rule 146. Thus, our new
"limited offering" (the term used by Professor Loss in § 227) would
have the following characteristics:
(a) the aggregate amount at which the issue is offered to the
public would not exceed $500,000;
(b) it would be available to non-corporate as well as corporate
issuers;
(c) there could be no general advertising or general solicitation;
(d) a commission could be paid;
(e) there need be no restriction on the number of beneficial
holders of the issuer's securities either before or after the issue;
(f) thirty-five purchasers would be permitted under generally
the same kinds of conditions and restrictions as are found in Rule 146
and proposed Rule 240;
(g) the securities would be subject to the same limitations on
resale as are found in Rule 146 and proposed Rule 240; and, in ad-
dition, resales of any of the securities involved in the offering before
a date three years after the last sale to any of the initial buyers (one
year in case of registrants under § 12 of the 1934 Act) should not
result in more than thirty-five owners of those securities at any one
time.
(h) a notice to the SEC similar to that found in proposed Rule
240 would be required; and
(i) the issuer would be required to deliver an offering circular
which would provide a simplified version of the information required
in Schedule 1A under Regulation A. This offering circular would
not be reviewed by the SEC.
1
3 1 See note 123 supra and accompanying text. A comment letter prepared by members of
the American Bar Association Subcommittee on the 1933 Act raises questions as to the advis.
ability of using as the statutory basis for Proposed Rule 240, §3(b) of the 1933 Act: reliance
on §3(b) rather than on §4(2) may (a) support the inference that an exemption under §
4(2) of the 1933 Act for a small offering is available only if all offerecs art sophistkatd and
able to fend for themselves; (b) it raises a varie:y of other problems in integration of present
rules and doctrines under §3(b). Letter of Carl Schneider and Melvin Katz to Securities and
Exchange Commission dated October 4, 1974.
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Clauses (h) and (i) are not part of the ALI Code solution but rather an
attempt to maintain present SEC traditions as set forth in the various
regulations under § 3 (b), such as Regulation A, Rule 227, and proposed
Rule 240.
We would further propose on issues not exceeding $100,000, pro-
vided that no sales commissions were paid, that the filing of the notice
with the SEC be eliminated and if there were ten or less purchasers, the
offering circular requirement be eliminated.
If a proposal such as this were adopted, then perhaps we might then
fulfill the original characterization of the Act that was contained in the
House Report which stated that the Act "carefully exempts from its ap-
plication certain types of securities and security transactions where there
is not practical need for its application or where the public benefits are
too remote."
APPENDIX
RULE 146
(a) Definitions. The following definitions shall apply for purposes of this rule.
(1) Offeree Representative. The term "offeree representative" shall mean
any person or persons, each of whom the issuer and any person acting on its behalf,
after making reasonable inquiry, have reasonable grounds to believe and believe
satisfies all of the following conditions:
(i) is not an affiliate, director, officer or other employee of the issuer, or
beneficial owner of 10 percent or more of any class of the equity securities or 10
percent or more of the equity interest in the issuer, except where the offeree is:
(a) related to such person by blood, marriage or adoption, no more
remotely than as first cousin;
(b) any trust or estate in which such person or any persons related to
him as specified in subdivision (a) or (c) collectively have 100 percent of the
beneficial interest (excluding contingent interests) or of which any such person
serves as trustee, executor, or in any similar capacity; or
(c) any corporation or other organization in which such person or any
persons related to him as specified in subdivision (a) or (b) collectively are the
beneficial owners of 100 percent of the equity securities (excluding directors' qual-
ifying shares) or equity interest;
(ii) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters
that he, either alone, or together with other offeree representatives or the offere,
is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment;
(iii) is acknowledged by the offeree, in writing, during the course of the
transaction, to be his offeree representative in connection with evaluating the merits
and risks of the prospective investment; and
(iv) discloses to the offeree, in writing, prior to the acknowledgement
specified in subdivision (iii), any material relationship between such person or its
affiliates and the issuer or its affiliates, which then exists or is mutually understood
to be contemplated or which has existed at any time during the previous two years,
and any compensation received or to be received as a result of such relationship.
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NOTE 1: Persons acting as offeree representatives should consider
the applicability of the registration and anti-fraud provisions relating to
brokers and dealers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and re-
lating to investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
NOTE 2: The acknowledgment required by subdivision (iii) and
the disclosure required by subdivision (iv) must be made with specific
reference to each prospective investment. Advance blanket acknowledg-
ment, such as for "all securities transactions" or "all private placements,"
is not sufficient. -
NOTE 3: Disclosure of any material relationships between the of-
feree representative or its affiliates and the issuer or its affiliates does not
relieve the offeree representative of its obligation to act in the interest of
the offeree.
(2) Issuer. The definition of the term "issuer" in Section 2(4) of the Act
shall apply, provided that notwithstanding that definition, in the case of a proceed-
ing under the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee, receiver, or debtor in possession shall be
deemed to be the issuer in an offering for purposes of a plan of reorganization or
arrangement, if the securities offered are to be issued pursuant to the plan, whether
or not other like securities are offered under the plan exchange for securities of,
or claims against, the debtor.
(3) Affiliate. The term "affiliate" of a person means a person that directly
or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or
is under common control with such person.
(4) Material. The term "material" when used to modify "relationship"
means any relationship that a reasonable investor might consider important in the
making of the decision whether to acknowledge a person as his offeree representa-
tive.
(b) Conditions to be Met. Transactions by an issuer involving the offer, offer
to sell, offer for sale or sale of securities of the issuer that are part of an offer-
ing that is made in accordance with all the conditions of this rule shall be deemed
to be transactions not involving any public offering within the meaning of Section
4(2) of the Act.
(1) For purposes of this rule only, an offering shall be deemed not to include
offers, offers to sell, offers for sale or sales of securities of the issuer pursuant to the
exemptions provided by Section 3 or Section 4(2) of the Act of pursuant to a
registration statement filed under the Act, that take place prior to the six month pe-
riod immediately preceding or after the six month period immediately following
any offers, offers for sale or sales pursuant to this rule, provided, that there are dur-
ing neither of said six month periods any offers, offers for sale or sales of securities
by or for the issuer of the same or similar class as those offered, offered for sale or
sold pursuant to the rule.
NOTE: In the event that securities of the same or similar class as
those offered pursuant to the rule are offered, offered for sale or sold less
than six months prior to or subsequent to any offer, offer for sale or sale
pursuant to the rule, see Preliminary Note 3 hereof as to which offers,
offers to sell, offers for sale or sales may be deemed to be part of the of-
fering.
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(c) Limitations on Manner of Offering. Neither the issuer nor any person act-
ing on its behalf shall offer, offer to sell, offer for sale, or sell the securities by
means of any form of general solicitation or general advertising, including but not
limited to, the following:
(1) Any advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in
any newspaper, magazine or similar medium or broadcast over television or radio;
(2) Any seminar or meeting, except that if subparagraph (d) (1) is satisfied
as to each person invited to or-attending such seminar or meeting, and, as to per-
sons qualifying only under subdivision (d) (1) (ii), such persons are accompanied
by their offeree representative(s), then such seminar or meeting shall be deemed
not to be a form of general solicitation or general advertising; and
(3) Any letter, circular, notice or other written communication, except that
if subparagraph (d) (1) is satisfied as to each person to whom the communication
is directed and the communication contains an undertaking to provide the informa-
tion specified by subparagraph (e) (1) on request, such communication shall be
deemed not to be a form of general solicitation or general advertising.
(d) Nature of Offerees. The issuer and any person acting on its behalf who
offer, offer to sell, offer for sale or sell the securities shall have reasonable grounds
to believe and shall believe:
(1) immediately prior to making any offer, either:
(i) that the offeree has such knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the pro-
spective investment, or
(ii) that the offeree is a person who is able to bear the economic risk of
the investment
and
(2) immediately prior to making any sale, after making reasonable inquiry,
either:
(i) that the offeree has such knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the pro-
spective investment, or
(ii) that the offeree and his offeree representative(s) together have such
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that they are capable
of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment and that the of-
feree is able to bear the economic risk of the investment.
(e) Access to or Furnishing of Information.
NOTE: Access can only exist by reason of the offeree's position
with respect to the issuer. Position means an employment or family re-
lationship or economic bargaining power that enables the offeree to ob-
tain information from the issuer in order to evaluate the merits and risks
of the prospective investment.
(1) Either
(i) each offeree shall have access during the course of the transaction and
prior to the sale to the same kind of information that is specified in Schedule A
of the Act, to the extent that the issuer possesses such information or can acquire
it without unreasonable effort or expense; or
(ii) each offeree or his offeree representative(s), or both, shall have been
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furnished during the course of the transaction and prior to sdle, by the issuer or
any person acting on its behalf, the same kind of information that is specified in
Schedule A of the Act, to the extent that the issuer possesses such information or
can acquire it without unreasonable effort or expense. This condition shall be
deemed to be satisfied as to an offeree if the offeree or his offeree representative is
furnished with information, either in the form of documents actually filed with
the Commission or otherwise, as follows: %
(a) in the case of an issuer that is subject to the reporting requirements
of Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
(1) the information contained in the annual report required to be
filed under the Exchange Act or a registration statement on Form S-1 under the
Act or on Form 10 under the Exchange Act, whichever filing is the most recent
required to be filed, and the information contained in any definitive proxy state-
ment required to be filed pursuant to Section 14 of the Exchange Act and in any
reports or documents required to be filed by the issuer pursuant to Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, since the filing of such annual report or registra.
tion statement, and
(2) a brief description of the securities being offered, the use of
the proceeds from the offering, and any material changes in the issuer's affairs
which are not disclosed in the documents furnished;
(b) in the case of all other issuers, the information that would be re-
quired to be included in a registration statement filed under the Act on the form
which the issuer would be entitled to use, provided, however, that if the issuer does
not have the audited financial statements required by such form and cannot obtain
them without unreasonable effort or expense, such financial statements may be pro-
vided on an unaudited basis;
(c) notwithstanding subdivision (e) (1) (ii) (a) and (b) exhibits re-
quired to be filed with the Commisson as part of a registration statement or report
need not be furnished to each offeree or offeree representative if the contents of
the exhibits are identified and such exhibits are available pursuant to subparagraph
(e) (2)
and
(2) The issuer shall make available, during the course of the transaction and
prior to sale, to each offeree or his offeree representative(s) or both, the opportu-
nity to ask questions of, and receive answers from, the issuer or any person acting
on its behalf concerning the terms and conditions of the offering and to obtain any
additional information, to the extent the issuer possesses such information or can
acquire it without unreasonable effort or expense, necessaty to verify the accuracy
of the information obtained pursuant to subparagraph (e) (1) above; and
(3) The issuer or any person acting on its behalf shall disclose to each of-
feree, in writing, prior to sale:
(i) any material relationship between his offeree representative(s) or its
affiliates and the issuer or its affiliates, which then exists or mutually is understood
to be contemplated or which has existed at any time during the previous two years,
and any compensation received or to be received as a result of such relationship;
(ii) that a purchaser of the securities must bear the economic risk of the
investment for an indefinite period of time because the securities have not been
registered under the Act and, therefore, cannot be sold unikss they are subsequently
registered under the Act or an exemption from such registration is available; and
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(iii) the limitations on disposition of the securities set forth in subpara-
graphs (h)(2), (h)(3), and (h)(4) of the rule.
NOTE: Information need not be provided and opportunity to ob-
tain additional information need not be continued to be provided to any
offeree or offeree representative who, during the course of the transaction,
indicates that he is not interested in purchasing the securities offered, or,
except in the case of any undertaking made pursuant to subparagraph
(c) (3), to whom the issuer or any person acting on its behalf has de-
termined not to sell the securities.
(f) Business Combinations.
(1) The term "business combination" shall mean any transaction of the type
specified in paragraph (a) of Rule 145 under the Act.
(2) All the conditions of this rule except paragraph (d) and subparagraph
(h) (4) shall apply to business combinations.
NOTE: Notwithstanding the absence of a written agreement pur-
suant to subparagraph (h) (4), any securities acquired in an offering
pursuant to paragraph (f) are restricted and may not be resold without
registration under the Act or an exemption therefrom.
(3) For purposes of paragraph (f) only, the issuer and any person acting
on its behalf, after making reasonable inquiry, shall have reasonable grounds to
believe, and shall believe, at the time that any plan for a business combination is
submitted to security holders for their approval, that each offeree either alone or
with his offeree representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial
and business matters that he is or they are capable of evaluating the merits and
risks of the prospective investment.
(4) In addition to information required by paragraph (e), the issuer shall
provide, in writing, to each offeree at the time the plan is submitted to security
holders for approval, information about any terms or arrangements of the proposed
transaction relating to any security holder that are not identical to those relating
to all other security holders.
(g) Number of Purchasers.
(1) There shall be no more than thirty-five purchasers of the securities of
the issuer from the issuer in any offering pursuant to the rule.
NOTE: See subparagraph (b) (1), the note thereto and the Pre-
liminary Notes as to what may or may not constitute an offering pur-
suant to the rule.
(2) For purposes of computing the number of purchasers for subparagraph
(g) (1) only:
(i) the following purchasers shall be excluded:
(a) any relative or spouse of a purchaser and any relative of such
spouse, who has the same home as such purchaser; and
(b) any trust or estate in which a purchaser or any of the persons re-
lated to him as specified in subdivision (g) (2) (i) (a) or (c) collectively have 100
percent of the beneficial interest (excluding contingent interests);
(c) any corporation or other organization of which a purchaser or any
of the persons related to him as specified in subdivision (g) (2) (i) (a) or (b)
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collectively are the beneficial owners of all the equity securities (excluding direc-
tors' qualifying shares) or equity interest; and
(d) any person who purchases or agrees in writing to purchase for cash
in a single payment or installments, securities of the issuer in the aggregate amount
of $150,000 or more.
NOTE: The issuer would have to satisfy all the other provisions of
the rule with respect to the purchasers specified in subdivision (g) (2) (i),
(ii) There shall be counted as one purchaser any corporation, partnership,
association, joint stock company, trust or unincorporated organization, except that
if such entity was organized for the specific purpose of ac:quiring the securities of-
fered, each beneficial owner of equity interests or equity securities in such entity
shall count as a separate purchaser.
NOTE: See Preliminary Note 5 as to other persons who are con.
sidered to be purchasers.
(h) Limitations on Disposition. The issuer and any person acting on its behalf
shall exercise reasonable care to assure that the purchasers of the securities in the
offering are not underwriters within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.
Such reasonable care shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:
(1) making reasonable inquiry to determine if the purchaser is acquiring the
securities for his own account or on behalf of other persons;
(2) placing a legend on the certificate or other document evidencing the se-
curities stating that the securities have not been registered under the Act and
setting forth or referring to the restrictions on transferability and sale of the se-
curities;
(3) issuing stop transfer instructions to the issuer's transfer agent, if any,
with respect to the securities, or, if the issuer transfers its own securities, making
a notation in the appropriate records of the issuer; and
(4) obtaining from the purchaser a signed written agreement that the se-
curities will not be sold without registration under the Act or exemption there-
from.
NOTE: Subparagraph (h) (4) does not apply to business combina-
tions as described in paragraph (f). Notwithstanding the absence of a
written agreement, the securities are restricted and may not be resold
without registration under the Act or an exemption therefrom. The is-
suer for its own protection should consider, however, obtaining such
written agreement even in business combinations.
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